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Abstract: 
As transit agencies and municipalities are facing financial stress and political pressures to 
expand transit, many jurisdictions are starting to use non-traditional funding methods like Land 
Value Capture to fund transit oriented investments. Land Value Capture is useful because it 
allows for the transit agency to tap into publically created land value increment. In particular, 
Development-Based Land Value Capture is favoured by many transit practitioners as a popular 
non-traditional funding source for its high revenue potentials, low financial and political risks, 
and low implementation costs.  It can be facilitated through the direct transaction of properties 
whose values have been increased by public regulatory decisions or infrastructure investment. 
The main objective of this paper is for transit planners to gain a practical understanding 
for the benefits and challenges of using Development-Based Land Value Capture to fund transit 
oriented investments in the City of Toronto. Section 1 sets the context for Development-Based 
Land Value Capture by introducing the history and evolution of transit development and finance 
in Toronto. Section 2 describes what Development-Based Land Value Capture and Tax- or Fee- 
Based Land Value Capture are, while also outlining the rationale for using Land Value Capture. 
This section also highlights some of the enabling factors for successful Development-Based 
Land Value Capture implementation. Section 3 expands upon this discussion by providing an 
analysis of the Development-Based Land Value Capture implementation challenges surrounding 
the Eglinton Crosstown Light Rail Transit project (ECLRT) and Metrolinx’s request for proposal 
(RFP) to sell the development rights at four station properties along the ECLRT corridor in 
Toronto.  
The main takeaway of this paper is that Development-Based Land Value Capture is a 
useful tool that transit planners can engage in to finance their transit-oriented investments. 
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However, even the most basic forms of Development-Based Land Value Capture can be difficult 
to implement in practice. Based on a reading of this paper, transit planners should be able to 
anticipate some challenges that they may face in implementing Development-Based Land Value 
Capture in a city like Toronto. This paper should also open up the discussion amongst transit 
planners about Development-Based Land Value Capture implementation in Toronto. 
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Foreword: 
The following paper is a culmination of the areas of concentration outlined in my Plan of 
Study: “planning for transit oriented development” and “urban transportation planning”. When I 
began the Master’s in Environmental Studies Planning Program I was interested in examining 
the ways that transit agencies could finance their own transit investments through alternative 
funding methods rather than relying on traditional farebox revenues. Months after starting the 
program, I was intrigued by Metrolinx’s announcement that they would finance their transit 
investments through the sale of development rights at locations along the proposed Eglinton 
Crosstown Light Rail Transit corridor. This financing concept used in many transit oriented 
development projects was known as land value capture. In order to explore the concept of land 
value capture further, I chose to analyze its different typologies and study if it could be used in 
Toronto to fund transit oriented investments. This would be partly achieved through a case study 
of the Eglinton Crosstown project. The research presented here has allowed me to achieve the 
following objectives: 
1.2 – To gain a thorough understanding of the role(s) of each actor involved in highly politicized 
transit planning… and development process…  
My research has allowed me to explore how the transit agency can act as a catalyst for 
bringing together public and private sector actors in development based land value capture. 
These are many of the same actors involved in the transit oriented development field. 
The transit agency can act as a catalyst for bringing together public and private sector actors 
1.3 – To gain an in depth understanding of the integral connection between land use and 
transportation planning 
Throughout my MES degree I have had a fascination with urban economics. This paper 
allowed me to development my knowledge of transit-induced land capitalization and 
explore the effect that Toronto’s first subway line had on property values. In particular, 
land value capture works because accessibility and agglomeration benefits of transit 
infrastructure investment get capitalized into the price of land around stations and transit 
corridors.  
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2.2 – To attain a thorough comprehension of the financing techniques that could help initiate 
and fund transit development 
This research has allowed me to engage directly with the intricacies of urban transportation 
planning and the alternative financing technique known as land value capture that can be 
used in transit development. I have a deeper understanding of the planning, political and 
organizational challenges surrounding development based land value capture 
implementation both in Toronto.  
 
With the completion of my major paper, I believe that I have successfully fulfilled the 
expectations that I had for my program. With the additional land use planning, real estate, condo 
and construction law courses that I am taking in law school, I hope to one day combine that 
knowledge with my expertise in development-based land value capture to facilitate development-
based land value capture deals such as joint development ventures. 
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Objectives and Methodology: 
I strive to use my paper as an outlet for re-engaging transit planners in the discussion 
surrounding the alternative methods that cash-strapped transit authorities in Toronto can engage 
in to pay for their transit oriented investments. In particular, my discussion centers around 
development-based land value capture (DBLVC) and how transit agencies in Toronto can 
potentially re-engage themselves in this practice.  
The main objective of this paper is for transit planners to gain a practical understanding 
for the benefits and challenges of using Development-Based Land Value Capture to fund transit 
oriented investments in the City of Toronto. Based on a reading of this major paper, it is my hope 
that transit planners can anticipate any challenges that they may face in the future DBLVC 
implementation in their own cities. This paper should also open up the discussion surrounding 
DBLVC implementation in Toronto. The main takeaway of this paper is that DBLVC is a useful 
tool that transit planners can engage in to finance their transit-oriented investments. However, 
even the most basic forms of DBLVC can be difficult to implement in practice. 
These objectives are met in the three main sections of my major paper. In Section 1, I set 
the context for this major paper by introducing the history and evolution of transit development 
and finance in Toronto. This analysis includes a discussion about the financial and political 
forces that have altered the ways in which experts approach transit development in the City. In 
Section 2, I describe what land value capture is and the rationale behind its use. Additionally, I 
outline the strengths and weaknesses of tax- or fee-based (TBLVC) and development-based 
(DBLVC) land value capture instruments through an analysis of the literature on land value 
capture and providing a case study on the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s 
joint development practice. In Section 3, I expand upon this discussion by providing an overview 
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of the Eglinton Crosstown Light Rail Transit project (ECLRT) and Metrolinx’s request for 
proposal (RFP) to sell the development rights at four station properties along the ECLRT 
corridor. I outline the planning, political, and intra-organizational barriers that the transit agency 
faced in implementing DBLVC at the selected ECLRT station properties.  
The methodology for my major paper was based on both primary and secondary research. 
Primary research was gathered from three semi-structured interviews that I conducted with two 
transit planners from Metrolinx on June 1st, 20th, and 29th, 2017. These interviewees have chosen 
to keep their anonymity so I have not named them or identified their divisions within Metrolinx 
in this major paper.  My primary research was used in Section 3 to generate the case study for the 
ECLRT project.  Secondary research involved an analysis of both qualitative and quantitative 
data from secondary sources such as journal articles, government reports, working papers, 
websites and consultant reports. This secondary research was used in all three major sections of 
my major paper. 
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Section 1 
Introduction: Developing and Financing Transit Investments in 
Toronto 
In Section 1, I set the context for this major paper by introducing the history and 
evolution of transit development and financing in Toronto. I outline the effects of the first Yonge 
Subway development on real estate values in the City and the role that land value capture (LVC) 
played in the project. In the following chapters I describe how the value planning philosophy 
once adopted by the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) was abandoned due to an eventual loss 
of their fiscal and political autonomy. Later on I explain how the transit authorities in Toronto 
began to face a plethora of financial issues, what spurred these issues, and how they faced them.  
Lastly, I describe how political interference continues to taint the field of transit planning and 
development in Toronto. The purpose of this chapter is for planners to acknowledge that there 
has been a successful history of land value capture implementation in the City.  Financial and 
political forces have in recent years altered the ways in which experts approach transit 
development. This section provides planners with an opportunity to revisit the concept of land 
value capture and engage in an important discussion as to how we can finance our transit 
oriented investments in Toronto. 
1.0 A History of Transit Development and Land Value Capture in Toronto 
 The City of Toronto has a long history of transit development.  After constructing an 
electric streetcar system in the early 1890’s, the next major achievements were establishing the 
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Toronto Transportation Commission and the creation of Canada’s first subway system.1  In 1921, 
the Toronto Transportation Commission became a corporate body that was autonomous from the 
municipality. It was responsible for the operation of all public transportation within a 35 square 
mile radius that comprised the City at the time.2  The Commission was responsible for setting 
fares so that revenues would be sufficient to financially maintain and manage all transportation 
facilities under its control.  City Council did however appoint members of the Commission and 
had the final say on the amount of capital that could be borrowed on the City’s credit if 
required.3 
 April 15, 1953 marked the day that the Municipality of Metro Toronto was incorporated 
by the Province of Ontario.  Thirteen separate municipalities compounded into Metro Toronto 
and passed over their responsibility for major regional public transportation services. It was 
hailed as a “step towards the solution of the problems of rapid growth and development in large 
urban centres”.4  On December 31, 1953, the Toronto Transportation Commission officially 
became the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC).5 Overnight, the TTC was responsible for 
servicing and financing the 240 square miles within the Metro Toronto area.  The transit agency 
still remained a separate corporate body with five Commissioners appointed by the Metropolitan 
Toronto Council.6  Soon after the formation of the TTC came the planning and completion of the 
first Yonge Subway line. This subway line was not only a catalyst for rapid transit development 
                                                
1 David A. Wyatt, "All-Time List of Canadian Transit Systems," University of Manitoba. 
http://home.cc.umanitoba.ca/~wyatt/alltime/toronto-on.html#islands. (accessed May 20, 2017).  
2  Toronto Transit Commission, Transit in Toronto: the story of the development of public 
transportation in Toronto, from horse cars to a modern, high speed subway system (Toronto, 
1971), 6.	
3 Ibid., 6.	
4 Ibid., 10.	
5 Ibid., 10.	
6 Ibid., 11.	
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in North America, but it also played a large role in real estate development and how the urban 
fabric of Toronto evolved. 
 Hailed as Metropolitan Toronto and the TTC’s greatest public transit achievement, the 
plan for Toronto’s first subway envisioned the Yonge line “to run from Union Station under 
Front Street and then north under or paralleling Yonge Street through the heart of downtown 
Toronto to Eglinton Avenue”.7  The Commission believed that the subway system was such a 
priority that it was prepared to meet almost the full cost of the project from the start.  They 
understood the economic benefits that would result from the operation of rapid transit routes in a 
growing city and took the risk to assume eighty percent of the cost of constructing the Yonge 
line. The federal government on the other hand gave the proposed subway a twenty percent 
grant. Municipal electors were also in favour with this funding proposal based on a ballot box 
ratio of ten to one. The underground subway infrastructure was built and financed by the 
municipality out of general funds and subway structures and rights-of-way were provided by the 
municipality.8 
 From the early planning stages, the concept was to develop a line that would go straight 
into the heart of the business district. As described by the TTC, the idea: 
“was to take Toronto’s most heavily travelled surface transit route – a route 
that was already carrying at the limit of its capacity, a route that in peak hours 
was choked in paralysing traffic congestion – and replace it with a modern, 
high speed, high capacity subway line to run on its own underground right-of-
way”.9 
                                                
7 Ibid., 22. 
8 Ibid., 23-4. 
9 Ibid., 24. 
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On March 30, 1954, twelve stations on a 7.4 kilometre line were open to the public.  In 
five years, the Yonge line carried 360 million riders.10 This unexpected amount of riders 
indicated that this rapid transit development was accelerating the redevelopment of areas in the 
city and was helping to increase business and property tax assessments along the subway route.11   
 Real estate development was quick to follow the implementation of rapid transit.  Many 
new commercial buildings, office spaces and apartments were constructed along the Yonge 
Subway route by 1959.  In order to prove the financial effects of the Yonge Subway 
development on adjacent properties, a study was commissioned by the transit authority.  This 
study attempted “to isolate property considered to be within the subway sphere of influence and 
compare its position with other property in the City to try to determine if there [was] any direct 
relationship between the construction of a subway line and land values”.12  
It was discovered that between 1950 and 1959, the total assessment of property values for 
the municipality increased from $1,346-million to $1,788 million. During the same period, 
property adjacent to subway development increased from $530-million to $770-million.  Overall, 
the total municipal property assessment increased $441,670,000 (32.8%) while properties 
adjacent to the subway increased $239,924,000 (45.4%).13  In another ten-year assessment 
between 1952-1962, “areas contiguous to the subway had increased 58% compared with a rate of 
25% considered to be the normal growth rate over the same period”.14  As a result of the subway 
development, the additional increase of real estate development adjacent to the Yonge line 
                                                
10 Ibid., 34. 
11 Ibid., 34. 
12 Ibid., 35. 
13 Ibid., 35. 
14 Ibid., 35. 
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produced more than $5-million in annual property taxes.15  Such early studies in Toronto 
confirmed that transit development increased property values, added tax revenues to the City, 
and led to a building boom in downtown Toronto. Subway development also had an 
unprecedented land value uplift for properties owned by the TTC after the construction of the 
first portion of the Yonge Subway line. 
 Based of the use of the cut-and-cover construction technique when building the first 
portion of the Yonge line, the TTC acquired 22 blocks of land for $3.9 million between 1949 and 
1954 to allow for the subway to run beneath the side of the street (see Figure 1).16 
 
Figure 1 - Cut-and-Cover Construction of the Yonge Subway Line17 
 By 1977, 17 of the 22 blocks were leased for an annual rent of $500,000.18 The TTC’s 
leasing program grew to be so successful “that lease income stood to completely cover, over a 
number of years, the Commission’s costs of land acquisition”.19  By the late 1970’s, the City of 
Toronto and the TTC existed as a model for other cities looking to use development based land 
value capture.  In addition to the sale of air rights and excess land owned by the TTC, municipal 
planners provided the relevant up-zoning, floor-area-ratios, density bonuses, and design efforts 
desired by developers for higher density transit-oriented projects and joint development ventures 
                                                
15 Ibid., 35. 
16 Christopher Donald Higgins, "A Value Planning Framework for Predicting and Recapturing 
the Value of Rapid Transit Infrastructure" (master’s thesis, McMaster University, 2015), 226. 
17 Ibid., 226. 
18 Ibid., 226. 
19 Ibid., 226. 
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adjacent to transit.20 It was claimed that the TTC and Metropolitan Toronto both shared a key 
philosophy at the time to enter into projects based on their potential for land value uplift and 
financial impacts.21 This shared value planning philosophy may have contributed to the success 
of previous cost recovery practices adopted by Metro Toronto and the TTC. 
  The value planning philosophy may have started to pick up in the late 1950’s when 
Metro Council launched a cost recovery program in 1959 to discover ways to raise revenues 
from their properties.  This program began after Council suggested that the “lease or sale of 
surplus lands could recapture the costs of subway land acquisition”.22 The typical case in Metro 
Toronto was for the public sector to take part in land banking and later lease the surplus land and 
rights to the private sector developers.23  Metro Toronto’s Subway Property Committee played 
an important role as the “hardnosed business[person]” in this practice24.   
 The Subway Property Committee was described by developers as a group who knew how 
to negotiate, and understand private sector business problems.25  In fact, the TTC was described 
by Cadillac Fairview at the time as a “very business-like organization” with shrewd negotiators 
“that you can deal with, and that [comprehend] business issues in Toronto”.26 The Subway 
Property Committee was also described as being able to understand “not only a development's 
benefit to the TTC, but also its benefit to the city as a whole, and they attempt to see a project's 
full ramifications before making a decision”.27 The typical joint development venture 
encapsulated this value planning ethos. A member of the former Committee outlined a typical 
                                                
20 Ibid., 227. 
21 Ibid., 227. 
22 Ibid., 228. 
23 Ibid., 228. 
24 Ibid., 228-9. 
25 Ibid., 228-9. 
26 Ibid., 228-9. 
27 Ibid., 229. 
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instance that:  
“once it had been determined [by the TTC] that the right-of-way costs were to be 
recouped through the disposal of rights, it was the Subway Property Committee 
that suggested to Metro Toronto that land leasing would be preferable to land 
sales, and that the form of the lease would be such that it presented security to 
the developer and his prospective mortgage lenders” 
In order to carry out these value capture practices however, the TTC required to have the fiscal 
and political autonomy needed to act in this development framework.  Over time, “this 
autonomy diminished… Metro Toronto and the Province of Ontario gradually 
took more responsibility for subsidizing the TTC’s operations and infrastructure 
expansion. By 1962 it had become apparent that the TTC was no longer distant from the 
politics of Metro”.28 The next chapter will outline the financial issues surrounding transit 
investment in the City of Toronto. 
2.0 Financing Transit Investments in Toronto 
As previously outlined, development based land value capture mechanisms such as large-
scale land leasing programs and joint development arrangements were undertaken from the 
1950’s to the early 1980’s which successfully developed a high-density, transit-supportive 
corridor with high ridership and cost recovery for land acquisition.29 However, after a long and 
successful period of using alternative funding practices, the transit agency began facing financial 
issues. 
The TTC was able to fund the Yonge-University line entirely from its own resources and 
                                                
28 Ibid., 229. 
29 Jeff Kentworthy. "The Land Use and Transit Connection in Toronto." Australian Planner 29, 
no. 3 (1991): 149-54.  
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reserves.30 But despite this previous financial and political autonomy from Metro Council, it was 
quickly dissolving.  According to CD Higgins (2015), “the TTC quickly found its role politicized 
in Metro, with appointed officials overseeing operations amid strong and increasing pressure for 
service expansion in Metro’s outer municipalities.”31  With Metro agreeing to contribute funding 
to Subway line expansions, which included the upcoming Bloor-Danforth Subway line, this 
eroded the independence of the TTC. 
 The transit system was originally able to make its own “operating profits and finance its 
own development.” 32 When the TTC had called upon the municipality for financial help under 
political pressures from Metro Council, this autonomy vanished. The TTC was historically able 
to pay for transit themselves and make their own decisions.  With Metro Council contributing 
funds, they were given the upper hand in making important transit planning decisions such as 
locating a subway or implementing their choice of transit technology. Ultimately, “the political 
priorities of the Council’s locally elected members [outweighed] either land-use or transportation 
considerations” made by planners.33  
I agree with transit author CD Higgins (2015) that 1973 was considered the last year that the 
TTC was financially self-sustaining.  The original transit system was argued by the transit 
agency to work well using two zones because the double fare allowed for the Commission to 
cover the extra costs associated with providing suburban transit service.  Under intense pressure 
from the suburban Metro Councillors, the TTC chose to drop the two-zone system in favour of a 
flat fare.  As a result, the TTC’s growing financial deficit skyrocketed “from $2.9 million in 
1971 to $40.0 million in 1976” while later breaching “the $100 million mark in the early 1980’s 
                                                
30 Higgins, "A Value Planning Framework” 230. 
31 Ibid., 230. 
32 Ibid., 230 
33 Ibid., 230. 
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and [exceeding] $200 million in 1992.34 After achieving the impressive feat of operating and 
developing public transit in Toronto on a break-even basis for 50 years, transit development 
started to cause many financial repercussions for taxpayers.   
A 1971 study by Metro Council concluded that there would likely be some serious problems 
for the transit agency in “meeting [their] annual commitments for [decreasing transit] deficits if 
substantial fare increases were not to be introduced.”35 As a result, the municipality should find 
alternative ways to raise funds for transit investment.  However, the exact opposite happened.  
From this point onward, the use of land value capture mechanisms largely fell out of practice and 
TTC Commissioners began to raise fares to meet the funding shortfalls left by downloading.36  
At this point, I believe that the transit agency began taking what some critics refer to as the 
old-line reluctant transit operator position. The TTC began to only regard themselves as 
providers of transportation services and not savvy developers who could “seek profit in private 
sector activities as a means of reducing operating deficits and resulting public subsidies.”37 Some 
planners would argue that it is a public duty for the transit agency to engage in alternative 
funding practices because it is a ‘public’ transportation agency.  As a result, the TTC began 
ignoring an entire source of revenue that taxpaying riders and the transit system could benefit 
from by focusing all revenue generation on the fare box.  
                                                
34 Sewell, John. The Shape of the City (Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 1993), 
217. 
35 Ibid., 217. 
36 Brenda Thompson, “Fare Increases to pay for new transit in Toronto,” Socialist Project, April 
5, 2013, http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/798.php (accessed May 16, 2017). 
37 Louis E. Keefer, “Joint development at transit stations in the United States,”. Transportation, 
12, no.4 (1985): 339. 
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Moving into the early 1980s, the TTC covered as much as 68 percent of operating costs 
through fares.38  As one TTC spokesperson explained, “About two-thirds of the TTC’s operating 
budget is [currently] covered by fares paid by the riders”.39 The main issue is that while fares 
generated about a large percentage of the TTC’s operating budget, the rest primarily came from 
the City subsidy which was (and still is) the lowest in North America.40 By choosing to increase 
transit fares instead of finding funding alternatives, I agree with transit advocate Brenda 
Thompson (2015) that the transit agency also discouraged “transit use by punishing those who 
can least afford to pay and it [did not] generate very much revenue.”41  Such an ordeal kept the 
TTC strapped for cash and reliant on other levels of government to keep them afloat. 
Eventually “transit capital works requirements in Toronto were met 75% from the Province 
and 25% from the Municipality. However, this situation [was] becoming less satisfactory for the 
Municipality because the priorities of the Province [did] not always correspond to the strategic 
planning objectives of the Municipality”.42  Such funding issues are still at play today in the City 
of Toronto. The current mayor of the City of Toronto John Tory accused Ontario Premier 
Kathleen Wynne of the Province turning its back on the City when the provincial budget was 
released in April 2017 for not matching the Federal government’s funding commitment of up to 
40 percent of the cost of new transit projects.43 According to Mayor John Tory, without the 
                                                
38 Thompson, “Fare Increases to pay” 
39 Jennifer Palisoc, "How does the TTC’s funding compare to other transit ..." Global News. 
November 13, 2014, http://globalnews.ca/news/1670796/how-does-the-ttcs-funding-compare-to-
other-transit-agencies/ (accessed July 29, 2017). 
40 Ibid. 
41 Thompson, “Fare Increases to pay”	
42 Jeff Kentworthy. "The Land Use and Transit Connection." 
43 Ben Spurr, "Ontario Liberals Reject Mayor John Tory’s calls to match federal transit funding," 
The Toronto Star. April 27, 2017, https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/04/27/ontario-
liberals-reject-mayor-john-torys-calls-to-match-federal-transit-funding.html (accessed May 16, 
2017).  
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provincial funding, “transit projects that council has designated as its top priorities” such as the 
Mayor’s SmartTrack plan would not get developed.44  
The same sentiments were echoed during the debate over the Transit City Light Rail Plan. 
The province of Ontario told former TTC Chairwoman Karen Stintz that the TTC would not 
receive any provincial funding if they insisted that the TTC would “determine the scope of 
[Transit City light rail] projects.”45 Additionally, Ontario Minister of Transportation Bob 
Chiarelli “warned that if city council tried to impose veto conditions on the deal, the $8.4 billion 
Queen’s Park has promised would be off the table”.46  Many of these transportation 
infrastructure projects in question are planned and controlled by Metrolinx. 
 Metrolinx is the provincial transportation agency established by the Liberal government 
in 2006.  The agency merged with GO Transit in 2009. As described by Metrolinx themselves, 
“The organization’s mission is to champion, develop and implement an integrated transportation 
system for our region that enhances prosperity, sustainability and quality of life”.47  Furthermore, 
Metrolinx was established to provide ‘leadership’ and ‘coordination’ for transit such as the 
Eglinton Crosstown light rail transit project (ECLRT) for instance. Metrolinx takes all local 
transit projects into consideration and prioritizes them in terms of regional importance.48  Within 
                                                
44 Jennifer Pagliaro, "John Tory says Wynne government ‘turned their backs’ on Toronto with 
2017 budget," The Toronto Star. April 28, 2017, 
https://www.thestar.com/news/city_hall/2017/04/28/john-tory-says-wynne-government-turned-
their-backs-on-toronto-with-2017-budget.html (accessed May 17, 2017).  
 
45 Hamutal Dotan, "Council Approves Light Rail Plan," Torontoist. November 1, 2012, 
http://torontoist.com/2012/11/council-approves-light-rail-plan/ (accessed May 17, 2017). 
46 Ibid. 
47 Metrolinx, "Metrolinx Overview," Metrolinx. 
http://www.metrolinx.com/en/aboutus/metrolinxoverview/metrolinx_overview.aspx (accessed 
May 16, 2017). 
48 David Fleischer, “Understanding Metrolinx,” Torontoist. October 8, 2014, 
http://torontoist.com/2014/10/understanding-metrolinx/ (accessed May 18, 2017) 
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the City of Toronto, these new waves of projects will be planned, built by, and owned by 
Metrolinx while being operated by the TTC.49  Its job was, and still is, to create a transportation 
plan for the GTHA.  The Big Move (2008) Regional Transportation Plan was delivered by 
Metrolinx to provide this planning vision.   
Another important goal of Metrolinx was to find ways to fund transportation projects.50  
As a part of The Big Move (2008), a reoccurring five-year capital plan and Investment Strategy 
for the Greater Golden Horseshoe was developed. The Investment Strategy (2013) provided 
some suggestions for funding transit development in the GTHA “including [to] raise $2 billion a 
year [by] adding 1 per cent to the HST, introducing a parking levy for businesses, a new 5-cent 
tax on gasoline, and a 15-per-cent increase in development charges”.51 In addition, Big Move 
Implementation Economics: Revenue Tool Profiles (2013) was prepared by AECOM.  The 
consultant outlined that the report would:  
“provide readers with detailed information about each of the revenue tools that 
have been used in other jurisdictions to support the development of 
transportation infrastructure... The intention of these Revenue Tool Profiles is 
to provide adequate revenue estimates and create a basis to evaluate 
qualitatively the tools to help inform the development of Tool Kit options for 
funding the Metrolinx Investment Strategy.”52  
                                                
49 Metrolinx, "Eglinton Crosstown FAQs." The Crosstown. http://www.thecrosstown.ca/the-
project/faq (accessed May 17, 2017). 
50 David Fleischer, “Understanding Metrolinx” 
51 Ibid. 
52 Metrolinx, Investment Strategy: Investing in Our Region Investing in Our Future, 2013, 
Toronto, ON: Metrolinx, 
http://www.metrolinx.com/en/regionalplanning/funding/IS_Full_Report_EN.pdf (accessed May 
27, 2017). 
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Both the Investment Strategy (2013) and the Big Move Implementation Economics: Revenue Tool 
Profiles (2013) report looked into alternative funding mechanisms for transit development. Land 
value capture, “a tool that “captures” and dedicates part of this incremental increase to land 
value, through direct involvement in property development or joint ventures” was one of the 
tools analyzed.53  
Transit agencies like the Toronto Transit Commission no longer have the capacity or 
financial autonomy to cover their costs and get into the area of building transit oriented 
investments.  Despite these reports opening up the floor to conversations about transit financing 
methods, financing issues still plague transit development in Toronto. Additionally, despite 
having a Regional Transportation Plan, politics still plays a large role in influencing how transit 
development will unfold in the City of Toronto. The next chapter will outline how politically 
driven transit plans have tainted the field of transit planning in Toronto. 
3.0 Politicizing Transit Investments in Toronto 
Transportation planning can be perceived as a very standard and objective field measured 
by values. The field tends to balance multiple, often contradictory goals that are often influenced 
by strong political processes. In what some planners might consider the ideal world of 
transportation planning, the decision making could be left to professional planners and transit 
experts who would study a city’s needs. The transportation planners could play both a technical 
and coordinative role in shaping the future of transit.  On the other hand, politicians would 
potentially support this rational research and find ways to generate the funding required to build 
                                                
53 Metrolinx, Investment Strategy 
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and expand these systems.54 As one explores the field of transportation planning, they quickly 
realize that this is not how things work in reality.  In many situations, there are no clear answers 
as to who should be responsible for planning transit? who should decide what we are to build? 
and who should pay for it?55 This chapter provides some insight into the political interference 
that I believe is plaguing transit planning and investment in the City of Toronto. 
 Political interference continues to taint the field of transit planning.56 It is the case that 
“too often, politicians make decisions based on what is best for them” and not the municipality 
that they represent.57  Councils and politicians can have vastly different perspectives, goals and 
policy desires when it comes to transportation decisions.  As a result, observers say these 
decisions tend to be products of political terms and elections with self-interest regarded as a 
driving force affecting re-election hopes. Planning decisions are dreamed up on napkins in City 
Council meetings.58  The voice of the transit planner and their long term visions are drowned out 
in favour of short term promises that meet political agendas and their own dreams of leaving a 
physical mark on the political landscape. 
To contrast with this is the role of the municipal planner and the transit agency.  Transit 
authorities do not have the autonomy to make transit decisions in such a highly politicized field.  
We saw this historically unfold with the TTC. Where there could be coordination between the 
                                                
54 "Keep politics out of transit planning: Editorial." The Toronto Star. July 14, 2016, 
https://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorials/2016/07/14/keep-politics-out-of-transit-planning-
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55 Tricia Wood, "Politics Should Be Removed from Transit Planning," Torontoist. March 30, 
2018, http://torontoist.com/2017/03/politics-removed-transit-planning/ (Accessed May 5, 2017) 
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57 Gordon Chong, "The politics of transportation," Toronto Sun, March 4, 2017 
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58 Marcus Gee, "Toronto transit descends from tragedy to farce," The Globe and Mail. September 
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planner and the politician is generally competition generated by a political narrative. Examples 
of this narrative generated around transportation are subways v LRTs, bikes v cars, and 
downtowns v suburbs. Rather than actually creating a meaningful discussion, this competition 
drives transportation planning into a state of inaction and paralysis.59 Contributing to this lack of 
autonomy and inaction are the overload of decision makers who can be involved in 
transportation planning projects. For instance, in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) there are 9 
actors who are involved in transportation: the TTC, the City Planning Division, the City 
Transportation Services Division, GO Transit, York Region VIVA, Mississauga Transit, 
Municipal Licensing and Standards, the Ministry of Transportation, and Metrolinx and all of its 
divisions. As Alex Gatien (2017) explains: 
“In the City of Toronto proper, transit planning is a confused affair with the City and 
Metrolinx awkwardly sharing jurisdiction. The three phases of light rail along 
Eglinton are a telling demonstration of muddled responsibilities. The Eglinton 
Crosstown is being planned and paid for by Metrolinx, but the Eglinton West LRT is 
being planned by Metrolinx and will be paid for by Toronto as part of SmartTrack. 
Meanwhile, the Eglinton East LRT is being planned by the City, and due to the 
vociferous appetite of the Scarborough subway extension, it is presently unclear who 
will pay for it.”60 
 
In the meanwhile, left out of this tension tends to be the public who are rarely engaged in 
substantive dialogue about transportation planning projects. It tends to be the case that any 
                                                
59 Tricia Wood, "Politics Should Be Removed” 
60 Alex Gatien, "Toronto’s Transit Planning Problem Isn’t Politics, It’s Governance," Torontoist. 
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engagement in transportation planning is either after the fact or is not meaningful in influencing 
major decision makers’ minds61. 
One example of political decision-making influencing the field of transit planning in 
Toronto was the Transit City – Light Rail Plan by former Mayor David Miller and TTC Chair 
Adam Giambroni passed on March 16, 2007. The plan was based off of David Miller’s 2006 
election platform where the former mayor was hell-bent on the development of light rail lines in 
the City.  The vision was to extend a seven line, 122.4 kilometre light rail network to the far 
reaches of Toronto (see Figure 2).62 This plan included the Eglinton Crosstown LRT (ECLRT) as 
a priority project to be completed by 2020. 
 
 
 
                                                
61 Richard Willson, "Assessing communicative rationality as a transportation planning 
paradigm," Transportation 28 (2001): 1-31. 
62 Spacing, "TTC announces TRANSIT CITY plan," March 16, 2007, 
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Figure 2 - Transit City Light Rail Plan envisioned by David Miller and Adam Giambroni63 
                                                
63 Toronto, City of. Transit City Light Rail Plan. Toronto, ON: City of Toronto. 
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While the initial plan was passed by City Council with much support, in December of 
2010, the newly elected suburban Mayor Rob Ford cancelled Transit City on his first day in 
office.  The plan was replaced in favour of Ford’s election promise of more “subways, subways, 
subways” and his belief that the private sector could fully fund transit development in Toronto.64 
These statements were against the expert opinion of planners who explained that sufficient 
population and job densities were required to make a subway investment worthwhile.65  Despite 
the massive cancellation of light rail transit, the Eglinton-Crosstown LRT and the Finch-West 
LRT were the only first wave projects from Transit City to be saved by Metrolinx. This 
politically driven cancellation of a politically driven transit plan did not come without its own 
financial repercussions. 
Financing for Transit City was coming from the provincial and the federal levels.  In 
particular, “the Eglinton-Crosstown LRT was to be entirely paid for by the provincial 
government, which had committed over $8 billion towards the Transit City plan.”66 As a result of 
the cancellation, the province “stated that no further funding would be provided, that the City of 
Toronto would be responsible for paying for contract cancellation costs, and that any funding for 
the city’s transit plans would have to come out of the remainder of the funds committed.”67 As a 
result, all remaining funds were routed into the ECLRT project placing all other projects on hold 
and in limbo. 
  
                                                
64 Toronto, City of. Transportation Funding Strategy - Appendix B, 2012, 
http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2012/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-50609.pdf. 
65 Edward LaRusic, "Subways, Subways, Subways: Enough Already!," Elevature Blog. October 
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(accessed May 5, 2017). 
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67 Ibid. 
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From this example of the Transit City Plan and the ECLRT, we can see how political 
forces have shaped and re-shaped a transit vision for the City of Toronto.  The politically driven 
Transit City Light Rail Plan, although almost entirely cancelled by the Ford administration, still 
has ramifications for transit development in the City.  Although political administrations have 
placed a transit vision in doubt, it has granted planners and economists with the opportunity to 
study the ways in which we can fund these capital investment LRT projects through the use of 
financial mechanisms like development based land value capture.  My next section will outline 
what land value capture (LVC) is, its benefits and drawbacks, and provide the results of using 
development based land value capture (DBLVC) in a case study of WMATA’s joint 
development DBLVC practice. In my last section I will explain how Metrolinx attempted to 
reintroduce land value capture in Toronto through the Eglinton Crosstown Light Rail Transit 
project. I will outline the challenges and barriers that they faced and how transit planners can 
learn from their shortcomings.  
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Section 2 
Land Value Capture 
In Section 2, I describe LVC and its different typologies.  These include tax- or fee-based 
(TBLVC) and development-based (DBLVC) land value capture instruments. In this section I 
also explore the rationale behind using land value capture, explore the effects of transit on land 
values and will evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of using TBLVC and DBLVC to fund transit 
oriented investments.  The case study of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 
joint development program will be introduced to demonstrate how DBLVC revenue generating 
tools can be successfully implemented by transit agencies.  The purpose of this section is for 
planners to understand that DBLVC is a useful tool for financing transit-oriented investments.  
However, there could still be drawbacks to its use.  Even the most basic forms of DBLVC can be 
difficult to implement in practice. 
4.0 What is Land Value Capture (LVC)?  
 Based on my review of the literature on LVC, it is my opinion that Hiroaki Suzuki, 
Murakami, Hong and Tamayose (2015) provide planners with the most thorough definition of 
land value capture.  As they describe: 
 “LVC is defined as a public financing method by which governments (a) trigger an 
increase in land values via regulatory decisions (e.g., change in land use or FAR) 
and/or infrastructure investments (e.g., transit); (b) institute a process to share this 
land value increment by capturing part or all of the change; and (c) use LVC 
proceeds to finance infrastructure investments (e.g., investments in transit and TOD), 
and other improvements required to offset impacts related to the changes (e.g., 
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densification),  and/or implement public policies to promote equity (e.g., provision of 
affordable housing to alleviate shortages and offset potential gentrification).”68 
At its most basic definition, “Land Value Capture (LVC) is an [alternative] way [for transit 
agencies and investors] to capture the increase in the value of land and development generated 
by the improved accessibility of transportation. Improved access has value which is reflected in 
land and property values just like property which has waterfront views.”69 LVC proves to be an 
alternative funding method for transit agencies considering that most “financial figures indicate 
that fixed-guideway transit ridership has not been high enough to recover capital costs and 
operation and maintenance costs.”70 By capturing the increased value in land, the transit agency 
could fund more transit oriented investments (a public good) which could generate more public 
and private benefits.”71  Different jurisdictions have achieved the benefits of LVC by creating a 
virtuous cycle which is a chain of events with favourable results. According to the Metrolinx 
Investment Strategy (2013), jurisdictions can achieve these LVC benefits when: 
                                                
68 Hiroaki Suzuki et al., Financing Transit-Oriented Development with Land Values Adapting 
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Figure 3 - How to create a virtuous cycle of LVC benefits72 
As James McIntosh, Newman, Trubka, and Kentworthy (2017) outline, LVC also provides 
transit agencies and investors with an understanding of the overall value of a transit project.73 I 
agree that this allows for: 
• “An understanding of the net cost of infrastructure, 
• Development of options to offset the cost of the project, 
• Support for cost-sharing arrangements between stakeholders, 
• Support for long-term planning and integrated TOD policy development, 
• Support for project affordability and funding analysis, and 
• Development of a comprehensive project Value Proposition.”74 
For the purpose of this paper a transit oriented investment (TOI) is any transit related 
development within walking distance of public transportation (typically a station).  These 
investments could include any ancillary developments or transit infrastructure which could be 
financed through the use of LVC instruments. I shall focus on the added value around these 
transit oriented investments generated by transit and how LVC has the ability to finance them. 
The following section will expand on this discussion and outline the rationale for using land 
                                                
72 Metrolinx, Investment Strategy 
73 James Robert Mcintosh et al., "Framework for land value capture from investments in transit 
in car-dependent cities." The Journal of Transport and Land Use 10, no. 1 (2017): 160. 
74 Ibid., 160. 
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value capture. 
4.1 What are the Effects of Transit on Land Values and Who Benefits from Transit 
Investment? – A Rationale for Using LVC 
 As transit agencies and municipalities are facing financial stress and political pressures to 
expand transit, many jurisdictions are starting to use land value capture to fund transit oriented 
investments.  It is the typical case that many transit investments “are unable to be funded, due to 
the lack of strategic [funding] or ongoing budget allocation, without… exceeding lending 
limits.”75 I share the same opinion as Suzuki et al. (2015) that LVC is useful because it allows for 
the transit agency to tap into publically created land value increment. I agree that this “can be an 
efficient way to allocate resources by exploiting [the] positive externalities” of transit 
development on surrounding land values.76   
Studies have proven that there is a relationship between transit investments and land 
values. In what experts refer to as Transit-Induced Land Capitalization, “property values and 
rent generally rise with proximity to transit lines and stations, reflecting the more accessible 
nature of such properties.”77 However, transit-induced land capitalization (LVC) only occurs 
when there are accessibility and agglomeration benefits of transit infrastructure investment. 
These benefits eventually get capitalized into the price of land around stations or transit 
corridors.78 
 Accessibility benefits are “defined as the component of the total financial value of land 
or property that is explained by the access to natural, social and economic resources.”79 Urban 
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economists agree that “accessibility is measured as the distance from properties to transit stations 
and transit corridors that pedestrians encounter.”80  As Suzuki et al. (2015) states, “the degree of 
access is determined by a combination of travel congestion and activity location in cities and 
regions.”81  In terms of the transit investment, this benefit is “based on the well-established 
understanding that proximity to public transit influences property prices (since most people are 
willing to pay a premium to enjoy the social and economic benefits that proximity to transit 
affords).”82 For the most part, it has been revealed in academic studies that “development 
density/land value increases in the proximity of nodes or development density/land price 
gradients from nodes in a bid-rent curve.  In this sense accessibility can be regarded as [one] 
surrogate for measuring external economic benefits of transport investment.”83 Figure 4 below 
visualizes how transit accessibility benefits can lead to transit induced land value uplift. 
 
Figure 4 - The impact of transit accessibility benefits on land values84 
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 Transit investments could also generate Agglomeration benefits. These benefits are 
described as the “productivity gains arising from increasing the 'effective density' of economic 
activity in urban areas.”85 In the case of transit investment, there is typically an “increase in 
accessibility and affordable mobility options decreases the interaction cost within the spatial 
economy and boosts the agglomeration of economic activity, thus enabling greater scale 
economies.”86 Transit investment leads to more compact forms of urban development and 
improves the level of financial productivity in these areas based on the improved proximity of 
employees and consumers to surrounding businesses.87 I agree with experts that these economic 
benefits spurred by transit are capitalized into the surrounding land and property. 
 The typical beneficiaries of transit infrastructure investment are outlined by McIntosh 
et al. (2017). These can include: 
• “Land owners: due to increases in underlying land values. 
• Property developers: potential increase in developed real estate values, faster 
sales rates, reduced holding costs, and lower construction costs due to reduced 
parking requirements. 
• Transport system users: a more efficient, less congested transport system 
results in less time spent in transit, allowing more time for other activities and a 
better transit experience. 
• Business owners: increased economic activity due to improved customer and 
employee accessibility to their business, with workers arriving less stressed and 
more productive. 
• Federal/[provincial] and local governments: due to increases in land-property-
based revenue from existing levies and taxes from increased land and property 
values.”88 
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The benefits that these beneficiaries receive from the transit investment gets factored 
into the increase in property value surrounding the transit station or corridor. At the same 
time, there can be dis-beneficiaries of transit development. Although the transit agency and 
others benefit from the rise in land values surrounding transit stations and corridors, this 
can also have the effect of displacing low-income households in what urban planners call 
gentrification.89 Municipal planners should help transit agency and developers engaging 
in land value capture practices by providing “incentives to ensure that affordable housing 
is built close to transit stops.”90 A good example of this is introducing density bonusing in 
exchange for constructing social or rent-protected housing near transit stations. These 
incentives can be included in development-based land value capture agreements.91 
Before planners jump to conclusions about transit-induced land capitalization, it 
should be noted that transit investment alone does not always cause the price of land to 
appreciate, nor is it always the sole contributor to a potential increase in land value (see 
Figure 5).  I acknowledge that a financial uplift in real property value can vary depending 
on a range of factors including the type of property, type of transit, level of accessibility, 
mode of transport technology, and service related issues such as crime, noise and other 
forms of pollution.92 In agreement with Suzuki et al. (2015) I am also of the opinion that 
aside from the prevailing market conditions required for successful LVC, transit-
supportive policies (i.e., supportive land use regulation) must also be adopted by the 
municipality and the transit agency if they wish to capitalize on the external economic 
benefits of transit investment on nearby land.  Other external factors such as public 
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investments in social services and infrastructure, private investments on land 
improvements, and population growth and economic development could also play a factor 
in value uplift.93 These are some reasons why there are varying ranges of transit-induced 
land capitalization.  For example, studies proving that “the highest impact can be found 
downtown (where knowledge-and service-based business entities, such as finance and 
insurance, real estate, and advanced business services, concentrate around high-
accessibility transit facilities) rather than in suburban areas’ bedroom communities” 
demonstrates how there can be external factors to transit development.94 
Figure 5 - Land values and their beneficiaries95 
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5.0 What are the Types of LVC that can be used to fund Transit Oriented 
Investments? 
Suzuki et al. (2015) explain that there are different types of land value capture: 
“There are two main categories of LVC: development-based LVC and tax- or fee-
based LVC. Development-based LVC can be facilitated through direct transaction 
of properties whose values have been increased by public regulatory decisions or 
infrastructure investment [(e.g., transit development)].  Tax- or fee-based LVC is 
facilitated through indirect methods, such as extracting surplus from property 
owners, through various tax or fee instruments (e.g., property taxes, betterment 
charges, special assessments, etc.).”96  
Both TBLVC and DBLVC have different instruments that transit agencies can utilize to fund 
transit oriented investments (see Figure 6). In order to appropriately select which category of 
LVC to implement, a transit agency should understand the advantages and disadvantages of each 
instrument.  The following sections will outline the different categories of land value capture, 
their instruments, and why implementation of DBLVC could potentially be a better approach for 
funding TOIs. 
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Figure 6 - Various tax- and development- based Land Value Capture Instruments97 
5.1 Tax- or Fee-Based Land Value Capture (TBLVC) Instruments 
The three most common forms of TBLVC instruments are property and land taxes, 
betterment charges/special assessments, and tax increment financing (also known as TIF). Figure 
6 briefly outlines how each of these TBLVC instruments work. I agree with Suzuki et al. (2015) 
that while TBLVC can be useful in financing transit development and transit-oriented 
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investments, DBLVC instruments have a number of advantages over their tax-based 
counterparts.  
 TBLVC instruments are unpopular among practitioners for a number of reasons. Siding 
with the majority of practitioners who specialize in LVC, I must agree. Although there are 
benefits to their use, the three most common TBLVC instruments can be complicated to 
implement, require heavy planning and political coordination, and are always open to public 
resistance. 
Although property tax could generate high economic yields based on geographic area, it 
can be difficult for a cash-strapped municipality to funnel the additional tax increases towards 
transit oriented investments.  In addition, a large amount of government assistance and 
coordination is required, and an increased property tax could also lead to taxpayer resistance. 
When dealing with betterment charges or special assessments, governments impose a 
surtax on property owners for estimated benefits created by public investments.98 An example of 
this would be a surtax on properties found within a one-mile radius of a newly developed subway 
station. The surrounding properties would incur a predicted value uplift because of the nearby 
public investment. However, the challenge of precisely estimating revenue from this levy on top 
of existing property taxes could be faced with tremendous public resistance.99 This estimated 
betterment charge or special assessment is determined on how much value the property owners 
would capture from the public investment. It is difficult to set a surtax because of the 
unpredictability of the public investment’s uplift on nearby property values (both real and 
projected).  Accurately estimating the cost of the public goods provision is typically where 
resistance occurs. Another issue with this TBLVC instrument is that “revenues generated by 
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property owners are highly dependent on local economic conditions.”100 As a result, the revenues 
achieved from these betterment charges or special assessments are out of the hands of the transit 
investor who must rely on a strong and predictable local economy. 
The same issues could be faced when implementing tax increment financing (TIF). TIF 
is “a surtax on properties within an area to be redeveloped by public investment financed by 
municipal bonds.”101 To explain TIF in a simple nutshell, Daniel Dale (2014) outlines it as a 
three step process. These steps include: “One: [Declaring] certain neighbourhoods TIF zones for 
a certain number of years. Two: [Borrowing] money. Three: when property values increase in the 
TIF zones, [taking] all the extra tax revenue and [using] it to pay back off the debt, instead of 
paying for other programs and services.”102  The concept sounds simple, however, the main issue 
with TIF is its unpredictability when assuming when and how much development will occur. 
This unforeseen challenge of using the TIF TBLVC instrument was exemplified with the Atlanta 
BeltLine project as discussed by Daniel Dale (2014).  A form of TIF was estimated to raise $1.7 
billion (60 percent) of the $2.8 billion to be used for the development of new parks, transit and 
housing. After a national economic recession, “the revenue estimate dropped to $1.45 billion 
while the estimated project cost jumped to $4.3 billion.”103 The municipality would generally be 
on the hook to cover any funding gaps as was the case here.104 While TIF can trigger major 
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redevelopment of nearby transit station areas, the fact that it requires significant coordination and 
time for TIF negotiation between actors involved (i.e., municipality, transit authorities, land 
owners), and a strong urban land and real estate market can be considered weaknesses of this 
tool.105 Based on these examples I am of the opinion that transit agencies and municipalities 
should only use tax- or fee-based tools if they have previous land value capture experience and 
are in a rapidly growing urban region. 
5.2 Development-Based Land Value Capture (DBLVC) Instruments 
With DBLVC, transit agencies or investors are directly or indirectly involved in the 
delivery of development around transit stations. Transit investors could include independent 
transit developers and operators (although not typical in North America) or special purpose 
enterprises structured between governments, transit agencies and private investors for joint 
development ventures.106 DBLVC is typically a voluntary partnership between the public sector 
and the “private sector where each partner understands the business of the other and agrees to 
share the mutual benefit.”107  
The transit agency will provide transit which generates an uplift in the value of land 
based on improved accessibility. The transit investor will typically own the land and 
development rights surrounding the proposed station. This nexus between the transit agency and 
investor creates a mutual benefit.  Alternatively, the transit agency could own the land or 
development rights, and the transit investor (typically a private real estate developer) will engage 
in development of the transit oriented investment (e.g., a mixed commercial residential building 
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above the station). In most cases, “A voluntary partnership is then formed where the increase in 
value due to the transit is equitably distributed between the developer/landowner and the transit 
provider to help build” the transit oriented investment or “the transit that will generate the 
value.”108 Agreements between the parties on the form of contribution from the private-sector 
would typically be negotiated on a site-specific basis once an request for proposal (RFP) is 
issued. Contributions will vary depending on the specific characteristics of the development site 
and transit facility linkages.109 For these DBLVC ventures to be successful, a value planning 
ethos must be adopted by all parties involved. 
Value planning is an important concept for DBLVC. This was the ethos formerly 
adopted by the TTC and the municipality of Metro Toronto starting in the mid-1950’s. As Dapo 
Olajide (2013) explains, this “innovative approach to transit development… attempts to 
maximize value generation for transit projects.”110 More land is assembled than required for 
station development to allow for future high density development surrounding transit station 
areas. By owning excess land and/or air rights around stations, “transit agencies can be direct 
beneficiaries of the significant transit induced land value gains” if they plan to engage in 
DBLVC practice.111 It must be noted however that having publicly owned land is not enough for 
the transit agency to get involved in the implementation of DBLVC instruments.  
Good urban governance and institutional capacities are also required before 
implementing DBLVC instruments.  Municipal planners play an important role in allowing for 
DBLVC to succeed.  Planners must be able to enhance land values before recapturing the 
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increment for public investment.112 Planners could include the pursuit of transit oriented 
development principles in transit, land use and official plans.  It could also include changes in 
zoning or the creation of secondary plans and overlay zones in order to maximize returns on 
investment. At the same time, I am of the opinion that Suzuki et al. (2015) are correct in saying 
that transit and municipal planners should have the proper technical knowledge and financial 
expertise to take part in private sector investment projects. This allows for the clear facilitation of 
DBLVC “through public-private partnerships in integrating transport investments with land 
development and management.”113 Such expertise also allows for DBLVC contributions to be 
agreed on as early as possible. The Metrolinx LVC Discussion Paper (2013) outlines that early 
communication between public-private partners is a crucial aspect of DBLVC because: 
 “the largest gains are to be made in the initial stages of the development process 
before options are taken and site ownership transferred.  Any agreed contributions 
at this stage can be accounted for in the development process that follows. As time 
goes by, and certainty increases, value is taken out as developers anticipate 
increases in land value around the new transit. Hence, LVC is best secured before 
the line and station locations are fixed.”114 
 
Unfortunately, agreeing upon contributions at an early stage is not always practiced in 
reality. 
Finally, while these revenues could be used for a number of transit related financing 
purposes, I agree with Olajide and Arcé (2017) that even development-based “LVC schemes 
are only part of the funding solution” and “they will never be sufficient to cover the full cost 
of development.”115 Opportunities for DBLVC are driven by the market. There may be little 
appetite to engage in DBLVC and land acquisition if the real estate market is in a slump or is 
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facing uncertainties. As a result, transit agencies should not solely rely on DBLVC instruments 
to generate funds to finance transit oriented investments.116 These instruments should be 
considered as an alternative funding mechanism that could potentially cover some of the costs of 
transit investment. 
The most common forms of DBLVC instruments are direct property development, land 
sale and lease agreements (as we historically saw with the TTC), joint development, air rights 
sale, land readjustment, and urban redevelopment schemes. I will discuss each in turn. The chart 
on page 41 indicates some of the advantages and disadvantages of these DBLVC instruments 
(see Figure 7). This analysis is included so that transit planners and investors can understand the 
benefits and challenges they may face when selecting a particular instrument to fund transit 
oriented investments. 
Direct property development is the most straightforward DBLVC instrument.  It can be 
described as the direct involvement of transit agencies in the property development of excess 
land surrounding their transit stations.117 The advantage of this development-based instrument is 
that it has the potential to generate significant and lasting revenues for transit agencies.118 If 
municipal planners are able to grant transit-supportive upzoning for properties in question, there 
could be massive financial potential for the transit agency in their new role as property 
developer.  The largest issue with direct property development in Toronto is that organizational 
bylaws prohibit both the TTC and Metrolinx from being able to purchase property for the 
purposes of creating development sites.119 Agencies must find shortcuts around these bylaws in 
order to profit from direct property development. Joint development may be a solution to this.  
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The downside of this instrument is that there are significant financial barriers for entry into real 
estate development for transit agencies primarily being the acquisition of expensive property and 
construction costs. Financial barriers lead to an increased amount of risk with real estate projects 
that public sector transit agencies are not always willing to assume.120 Additionally, transit 
agency personnel must have the financial and development experience to undertake direct 
property development. If this expertise is lacking within the organization, then land sales and 
leasing might be a better avenue for transit agencies looking to use DBLVC to finance TOIs. 
Land Sales and Lease Agreements are two other forms of DBLVC instruments that 
transit agencies could pursue in order to enter into the LVC field.  The typical case of land sales 
is when a transit agency “sells excess acquired land or development rights around transit 
infrastructure at appreciated (post rail investment) land prices to developers to raise significant 
upfront revenues to finance transit [oriented] investments.”121 In order to achieve the largest 
return on investment, municipal planners should be in a position to recommend supportive land 
use regulations in order for the transit agency to be able to sell at the highest market value. If the 
transit agency does not already own the land in question, the high initial land costs may be a 
barrier for entry into DBLVC because of a lower return. This is why DBLVC goals must be 
communicated early on in the transit planning process before property prices increase. With lease 
agreements, “the transit agency or investor leases valuable land, or space above or below the 
land adjacent to transit stations to developers in return for annual land rents and or a single 
leasehold payment.”122 This could include air rights, ground, or subsurface leases. While land 
leases generate upfront and recurring revenues, and pose low financial risk for the public transit 
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agency, experts question the worth of this DBLVC instrument because it can generate only low 
financial yields which cannot cover the sheer costs of TOIs.123 In my opinion, these are two entry 
level DBLVC tools with which transit agencies could experiment. 
Joint Development is the coordinated development of transit facilities and transit 
adjacent property between public sector transit agencies and transit investors such as a real estate 
developer. Suzuki et al. (2015) explains that private developers typically contribute to the 
development by constructing the transit facility or financing part or all of the construction costs 
once the land and development rights have been transferred to them.124 Private developers have 
the incentive enter into joint development partnerships with public transit agencies on transit 
adjacent properties when there are potential land value uplifts generated by nearby transit.125 
Joint development ventures involve a cost and revenue sharing agreement between the transit 
agency and private developer (i.e., the transit investor). These could commonly include incentive 
based, voluntary, or equity participation and revenue sharing agreements. Joint development is 
advantageous for transit agencies because they are able to share financial risks and benefits with 
the private developer who has expertise the field of property development.  Another major 
advantage of joint development is the significant revenues that could be recovered compared to 
other DBLVC tools. On the other hand, transit agencies might face a disadvantage with this 
DBLVC instrument if there are disagreements with their joint partner over cost and revenue 
allocation. Moreover, these partnerships might not be worthwhile to enter into if zoning 
regulations do not allow for the highest and best use of the station adjacent properties. I am of 
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the opinion that private developers will not willingly enter into these ventures if they do not see a 
good enough return on their investment. 
With Air Rights Sales, “the transit agency [sells] the development rights above stations 
and transit adjacent land to developers to raise funds to finance transit investments.”126 To 
further explain, “the developable space above station and station-adjacent land is increased 
beyond the allowable floor space ratio (FSR) in the land use designation to unlock additional 
financial land value, which is then captured by the transit agency through sales to developers.”127 
This DBLVC instrument is able to help support the transit network by providing density, 
integrating other uses with the public transit station, and therefore improving transit access, 
potential ridership numbers and increased fare revenues. Air rights sales also allow for the last 
large scale development opportunities in downtown areas. Through the sale of air rights, transit 
agencies and developers could avoid assembling small parcels from multiple landowners.128 For 
the transit agency, this instrument is attractive because it could generate significant upfront 
revenues with low financial risk. However, I share the opinion with Nathan Bunio (2016) that 
“community opposition to air rights development [projects] can be a major deterrent to [a] 
proposal’s approval, and may inhibit the density [required] to make [a] project feasible.”129 
Furthermore, air rights development can be complicated from an engineering and construction 
standpoint.130 Once the transit agency sells the air rights, they must make sure that the air rights 
development project does not prolong any proposed transit development or else the transit 
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agency risks public opposition. The transit agency could also risk going over budget and hence 
face potential lawsuits if these air rights developments prolong transit projects. 
Land Readjustment is a DBLVC instrument where “individual landowners in a transit 
investment area (station area) pool their land together into a large site for redevelopment and in 
the process donate a portion of the assembled land to the government in exchange for zoning 
relaxation on the consolidated site.”131 Typically the transit agency would use a portion of the 
land for station development and the remainder is sold, leased or developed. This DBLVC is 
useful because it allows the transit agency to avoid the potentially high cost of land acquisition, 
but it is not widely used in North American. For the most part, I agree with Olajide (2013) that 
this is not a very reliable DBLVC instrument because the transit agency is heavily reliant on 
private landowners. Land readjustment is also not likely to happen in urban cores, but rather on 
the fringes of cities. The largest disadvantage of this tool is that it is very dependent on local 
planning and urban development policy to grant private owners zoning relaxations in areas 
where there can already be secondary plans or studies in place that call for a certain area 
planning precedent.132 It is my opinion that this DBLVC instrument should be avoided by North 
American transit agencies looking to engage in LVC unless they can overcome the 
disadvantages/challenges mentioned above. 
The last of the most commonly used DBLVC instruments is the Urban Redevelopment 
Scheme. Multiple property owners in a transit investment area form an association to (ADJOIN) 
individual land parcels into a single redevelopment site. A partner developer (this could be the 
transit agency) can temporarily assume responsibility for the landowning partners during this 
process. In the meanwhile, redevelopment plans would be sent to a municipal planning 
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department to receive transit supportive zoning changes and increases in FARs. Once these 
changes have happened, the developer or transit agency partner can sell the excess floor space to 
new property owners to fund transit oriented investments in the station area.133 Transit agencies 
taking part in this DBLVC instrument face many of the same challenges as those engaging in 
land readjustment schemes. Once again, it is my opinion that this DBLVC instrument should be 
avoided by North American transit agencies looking to engage in LVC unless they can overcome 
the disadvantages/challenges mentioned above. 
After a review of the most commonly used DBLVC instruments, it is my opinion that 
transit agencies who wish to enter into the field of DBLVC should consider engaging in land/air 
rights sales, lease agreements and/or joint development ventures. At some point, transit agencies 
might luckily acknowledge that if they keep “withdrawing revenue without simultaneously 
creating value, [their financial resources] will eventually be depleted.”134 Some transit agencies 
might still face some challenges when first engaging in these DBLVC instruments. However, 
they will eventually be able to find an additional revenue source for financing their transit 
oriented investments. At the same time, these transit agencies can potentially avoid having to 
face the difficult challenges of more intricate forms of TBLVC or DBLVC instruments outlined 
above. The next chapter will expand on the discussion of DBLVC instruments and provide 
planners with a justification for why some experts prefer to engage in DBLVC instruments rather 
than their TBLVC counterparts. 
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Figure 7 - The advantages and disadvantages of common DBLVC instruments135 
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5.3 Why Do Some Experts Prefer DVLVC Instruments over TBLVC Instruments? 
Benefit Tax- or Fee-Based LVC 
(TBLVC) 
Development Based LVC 
(DBLVC) 
Higher Revenue Potential  X 
Lower Financial Risk  X 
Lower Political Risk  X 
Lower Implementation Cost  X 
Easier Implementation  X 
Figure 8 - Checklist Comparing Benefits of Tax-Based LVC and DBLVC 
I agree with Suzuki et al. (2015) that DBLVC has more advantages over tax- or fee-based 
LVC when it comes to financing transit oriented investments (see Figure 8). Primarily, there is a 
more direct and higher revenue potential with DBLVC than taxation-based solutions.136  
DBLVC has the greater potential to “finance capital-intensive transit or TOD-related investments 
without major fiscal distortions or public opposition to additional taxes or fees.”137 In cases of 
joint or direct property development, DBLVC can generate direct revenues from land value 
increases attributed to transit investments. As a result, this can lead to “increases [in] transit 
ridership, and therefore the fare income of the transit line, and [increased] viability of local 
services.”138 The implementation of DBLVC instruments can also lead to “more sustainable 
long-term revenues from properties (such as retail shops, leisure facilities, parking, and 
residential buildings to be developed around station areas)” due to transit oriented investments in 
the station area.139  
While tax-based LVC instruments are often challenged by practitioners on the accuracy 
and lack of conventional methods to calculate transit induced property value uplift, DBLVC 
instruments are more financially risk-adverse than tax-based methods.  DBLVC “involves 
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tractions of land, development rights, or air rights whose values have risen due to public 
investment or regulatory change” and I have to agree with Suzuki et al. (2015) these instruments 
establish “a clearer linkage between value creation and capture” compared to tax- or fee-based 
LVC instruments.140 This direct link between DBLVC funding contributions to a specific project 
generating increased profits is attractive to both developers and the public.141 Additionally, 
because DBLVC instruments are more site-specific (compared to tax-based LVC instruments 
like TIF or betterment charges) transit investors could engage in more market studies to predict a 
return on investment. If investors like a transit agency are operating in a stable market with 
relatively few market cycles, and high real estate demand and prices such as in Toronto, they 
would be susceptible to less risk. These same factors (stability and high demand for land) could 
also be regarded as barriers for cash-strapped transit agencies who wish to enter into the DBLVC 
practice.142 
DBLVC instruments also face lower political risk. I share the same opinion of Olajide 
(2013) that DBLVC instruments typically face a “low likelihood of public opposition to 
financially beneficial land and development [transactions]” because negotiations “between the 
[transit] agency and private partners in DBLVC [instruments] are conducted far from the public 
eye or without public participation.”143 Transparency might be considered an issue to the public, 
but it is required to avoid compromising RFPs for DBLVC projects. Planning issues such as 
NIMBYism are most likely to be considered more of a concern for these projects because 
residents surrounding station areas may be in opposition of increased height and density 
disrupting their “stable” neighbourhoods. 
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Additionally, DBLVC instruments allow for partnerships and sharing of financial 
costs and benefits. A great aspect of DBLVC instruments like joint development is that it allows 
for a partnership between the transit agency and the private partners. These partners could be any 
range of private land owners, developers, governments, or commercial entities. Rather than 
assuming all of the costs or risks involved in acquisition and/or development, these LVC 
instruments provide a good entry point for transit agencies who wish to start using an alternative 
method for financing transit oriented investments. Engaging in DBLVC allows transit authorities 
(like Metrolinx in Ontario) to demonstrate to taxpayers that they are financially responsible.144 
Through DBLVC partnerships, transit authorities are able to share “land value gains through 
mutually beneficial land and development transactions” (an alternative method of financing) “as 
opposed to exactions”.145 Experts like transit scholar Robert Cervero also hold “that a central 
element of [these partnerships is that they amount] to a quid pro quo, whereby [private partners’] 
benefits from transit accessibility are capitalized into higher rents and occupancy rates, and 
transit agencies' capital funding is enhanced through cost sharing mechanisms”.146 These 
ventures are typically executed “through the provision of significant development land and air 
rights for private partners, and the sharing of land value gains with private partners”.147  
Lastly, “The advantage of voluntary development-based LVC methods is that they do not 
require any new legislation and work with the grain of the development industry.”148 As a result, 
it is my opinion that transit agencies could implement DBLVC instruments more easily than 
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TBLVC instruments. However, it should be noted that “they only work where the private sector 
is convinced the transit facility cannot be fully funded by the public purse.”149 
From my planning and public policy perspective, DBLVC instruments could also 
promote more economic competitiveness, environmental sustainability and social equity targets 
for cities when compared to tax- or fee-based LVC counterparts.150  For instance, “by changing 
land use regulations” such as granting higher densities or converting uses (ex. Single Family 
Residential to Mixed Commercial Residential) “governments can develop articulated densities  
in station areas for diverse uses while increasing development-based LVC revenues.151  
Additionally, “by using development-based LVC revenues for TOD investments in station areas” 
like bike lanes or public squares, “governments, transit agencies, developers, landowners, and 
communities can jointly develop efficient, attractive and safe public places in [transit oriented] 
areas.”152 Lastly, “in exchange for FARs or other regulatory incentives, governments can require 
developers to provide social facilities, such as affordable housing units, daycare centers, and 
green spaces.”153 
6.0 Why isn’t DBLVC happening – What are the Challenges of Implementing DBLVC for 
Transit Agencies?  
 As I have outlined so far in the previous chapters, DBLVC can be a very useful tool for 
funding transit oriented investments. Even though DBLVC can be a great funding strategy in 
theory, the transit agency must still overcome the potential challenges of engaging in the 
practice. The Metrolinx Land Value Capture Discussion Paper (2013) outlined some of these 
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challenges for implementing LVC in the GTHA (see Figure 9).154 This chapter will review these 
potential implementation challenges that Metrolinx is facing in the GTHA according to the Land 
Value Capture Discussion Paper (2013). It is my opinion that other transit agencies wishing to 
engage in the practice of DBLVC can anticipate some of these challenges by reviewing this 
section. 
 
Figure 9 - Challenges to the implementation of LVC methods in the GTHA as Identified by Metrolinx155 
 It is first outlined in the Land Value Capture Discussion Paper (2013) that there needs to 
be an acceptance of the principle of DBLVC and its benefits by the transit agency.156 Every key 
player in the transit agency from the planners to the Board of Directors must accept DBLVC as a 
useful tool, but not one that solves all funding shortfalls. I would also add that there needs to be 
an understanding and acceptance of DBLVC by the real estate development industry if the transit 
agency wishes to undertake in joint development or other similar ventures.  At the same time, it 
must be accepted that DBLVC tools might not work everywhere. I am also of the opinion that in 
cases where “there is no uplift, the uplift to be reasonably captured is minimal, or the uplift is 
difficult to be captured” does not mean that LVC is a useless tool or that the transit agency is 
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erring in its application.157 In some cases DBLVC works and in others it does not. It can very 
well be the case that proper zoning and FARs are not in place for projects to generate enough 
revenues that would attract investors to a project. As a result, municipal planners must also 
accept that the transit agency wishes to undertake DBLVC and work with them.  Adding to this, 
it is my opinion that all departments within a transit agency should adopt the value planning 
philosophy. If a transit organization without much development experience wishes to enter into 
the practice of DBLVC, it is important that they place all of their institutional capacities into this 
effort. DBLVC projects should be prioritized with other large scale projects that the transit 
agency is working on (ex. Metrolinx Regional Express Rail). 
 An additional challenge for the transit agency in implementing DBLVC methods in the 
GTHA is based on a willingness to change and act as business people.158 Transit planners should 
have a willingness to listen to alternative views on transit financing, adopt a willingness to work 
across non-traditional transit boundaries, and have a willingness to work with partners who may 
have different values and objectives.159  This challenge alludes back to the transit agency taking 
the “old-line” reluctant transit operator position and avoiding joint development, real estate sales 
or leasing in their practices. Transit agencies like Metrolinx have understood the benefits of 
using DBLVC and want to change their approach to financing transit oriented investments. 
However, I also believe that “the willingness to change needs to be accompanied by a 
willingness to act.”160 The Land Value Capture Discussion Paper (2013), the Big Move 
Implementation Economics: Revenue Tool Profiles report (2013) and the Metrolinx Investment 
Strategy (2013) all show a willingness by the transit agency to engage in DBLVC practices. So 
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far, it is my opinion that Metrolinx has not been able to deliver much DBLVC work on the 
ground. I agree with the George Hazel Consultancy Ltd. (2013) that the transit agency might be 
able to accomplish more in terms of delivery if “Metrolinx [develops] an inventory of where 
significant development opportunities exist adjacent to existing or potential future transit.”161 In 
addition to this, the Land Value Capture Discussion Paper (2013) mentions that the development 
of a “sophisticated, accountable, and transparent LVC delivery and evaluation program that 
respects commercial confidentiality” could also help build a strong relationship between the 
transit agency and private development sector which could help spur DBLVC partnerships.162 
 A third challenge for the transit agency is being able to collaborate between public and 
private sector stakeholders when engaging in DBLVC.163 Strong working relationships should be 
formed between the transit agency, municipalities, senior levels of government and the private 
sector.  The Land Value Capture Discussion Paper (2013), recommends that collaboration 
should happen at strategic forums to improve communication between key players in DBLVC, 
and on a case by case basis in order for each player to benefit. I agree that private sector 
developers must have an understanding of the procurement and planning processes involved in a 
LVC project. At the same time, I also believe that there should be equitable benefits between 
partners and not situations where the transit investor/real estate developer takes advantage of 
their public sector partners. Equity and fairness should be met in every DBLVC delivery 
process.164  At the same time, I agree with the authors of the Land Value Capture Discussion 
Paper (2013), that the public sector transit agency should work with the market and understand 
its strengths and limitations. That could mean that transit projects are located in areas where 
                                                
161 Ibid., 25. 
162 Ibid., 26. 
163 Ibid., 18-19. 
164 Ibid., 19. 
Re-Imagining	Transit	Development	in	Toronto Soscia 49 
there is good land value capture potential. This could mean that “there needs to be a willingness 
of the municipal planning authorities to allow and support, and preferably maximize, 
development around transit stations.”165  
If municipal planners are able to use their toolbox to allow for large scale transit-
supportive development around transit stations, this will drive the DBLVC process and deliver 
the benefits of funding, sustainable development and high quality living associated with TOD.166 
It has been shown that “when transit is funded only by traditional government funds, there is 
usually no incentive for providing TOD.”167  If municipal planners use their tools to allow for 
LVC to more likely happen, this could potentially mean that there would be an incentive for the 
transit agency to provide TOD.  Support from senior levels of government is also important 
because “public funding for transit is tied to municipal support in terms of progressive TOD 
planning policies.”168 LVC projects could help achieve TOD objectives by creating an urban 
work-live-play fabric around station areas. 
 Another big challenge that I also believe the transit agency must face is potential changes 
to their policy and strategy on DBLVC. The Metrolinx Investment Strategy (2013) estimates that 
LVC (both DBLVC and TBLVC) can generate approximately $20 million of revenue per year 
for the organization.169 The Land Value Capture Discussion Paper (2013) outlines that this is a 
conservative revenue estimate; more revenue can be “achieved if LVC was pursued aggressively 
by government and government partners in collaboration with the private sector.”170 Transit 
agency policy and strategies for DBLVC implementation should reflect this.  The discussion 
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paper notes that one way to overcome this challenge is for the transit agency to take part in an 
exercise to estimate the development potential around station areas typically within a one 
kilometer radius. The test is outlined as making an “estimate [of] the number of residential units 
and areas of commercial and leisure developments around proposed transit lines and [taking] 
varying percentages of their value, say at 1 %, 5 % and 10%, to compare with the $20 million per 
annum Investment Strategy target.”171  This exercise will confirm the true uplift around stations 
on a case-by-case basis and test the “risk as to whether or not additional development attributed 
to the additional transit provision is in fact generating intensification of demand and therefore 
increased LVC.”172 Such a test will be able to estimate long-term value creation, financial 
benefits of ridership, and other economic benefits.  These estimates can be reflected in the transit 
agency’s policy and strategic planning efforts and push the agency to pursue DBLVC more 
aggressively. 
 The fifth challenge mentioned by the Land Value Capture Discussion Paper (2013) is the 
legal framework of the transit agency.173 The discussion paper outlines that there is no reason 
that DBLVC cannot be implemented under Canadian law. In particular, I also believe that the 
procedures to deliver DBLVC will need to be developed.  Current Metrolinx development and 
real estate policies do not allow for the acquisition of properties for the purposes of creating 
development sites. Metrolinx is currently working around these policies by utilizing some 
DBLVC instruments in order to achieve TOD objectives. As the Land Value Capture Discussion 
Paper (2013) notes: 
  “LVC is potentially a policy and asset maximization tool. Metrolinx holds 
significant assets and is in the process of examining how these assets can be 
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maximized for the benefit of Metrolinx and the city region. The focus of this 
work is on how to realize intensification and additional revenues from 
Metrolinx-owned property and on lands adjacent to Metrolinx-owned 
transportation corridor and station assets. Part of this examination should 
eventually include a review of current development and real estate policies to 
ensure that they are not restrictive with respect to the application of LVC 
methods. Indeed, they should positively help the introduction of such 
methods.”174 
 
I am of the opinion that if these development and real estate policies change to reflect a value 
planning philosophy, then LVC could be implemented more easily in the GTHA. 
 The last challenge to implementing LVC in the GTHA as outlined in the Land Value 
Capture Discussion Paper (2013) is potential changes to appraisal methods.175  Transit planners 
are typically well versed in traditional transportation analysis, but for the most part I agree that 
they do not usually take part in traditional real estate analysis and/or financial metrics/returns 
approaches. As the discussion paper describes, “traditional transit appraisal methods often do not 
account for land value uplift (and potential capture scenarios) because land use and the 
associated implication of how changing or tying land use can affect how one should evaluate 
such transit investments.”176 I agree that the only way to account for growth projections “is to 
show how real estate is directly tied into transit investment decisions. The advantage of LVC 
appraisal is that it is clearly seen to generate ”real money” which can be used to provide better 
access and hence improved competiveness, which in turn should support the financial 
performance of the transit and generate further benefits which can be accounted for in a variety 
of appraisal methods already in use.”177 This also means that transit agency planners need to be 
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versed enough in the fields of urban economics, finance and real estate development to make 
such projections.  
 These are just some of the challenges for implementing LVC within the context of the 
GTHA.  The next chapter will provide planners with some enabling factors that will help the 
transit agency implement DBLVC to fund their transit oriented investments. 
6.1 What Factors Are Required for DBLVC to Work? 
 In face of the potential challenges of DBLVC implementation, Suzuki et al. (2015) 
outline seven enabling factors for DBLVC to work.  Some of these enabling factors have been 
already alluded to in the previous chapters.  These enabling factors are important for planners of 
the transit agency to understand before they attempt to engage in any DBLVC practice. I have 
outlined each factor individually for easy referencing. 
DBLVC Enabling Factor #1: Macro Fundamentals 
Demographic and economic fundamentals are key to successful DBLVC. Suzuki et al. 
(2015) outline that DBLVC works well when urban populations and strong economic growth 
create high demand for land and property prices increase.178 Even in areas of slow economic 
growth, transit agencies and municipalities could adapt by creating station area plans early on 
(introducing TOD principles) and help crystalize the economic potential of these areas by 
addressing inadequate land uses and zoning codes.  At the same time, throughout my interviews 
with planners at Metrolinx, there was a desire for the agency to understand where development is 
going to occur, where it is not likely to occur and why?179 An understanding of market demand 
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could benefit the transit agency before even attempting to engage in the creation of early station 
area plans. 
DBLVC Enabling Factor #2: Visionary Master Plans 
Municipal policymakers and planners can emphasize transit infrastructure as the spine of 
spatial development strategies in cities.  I agree with Suzuki et al. (2015) that a long term land 
use vision will help guide planning, funding, construction and operations in a way that supports 
transit.180 These plans should be transit supportive and realize that higher order transit calls for 
higher densities in certain parts of cities. Municipal authorities should invite different 
stakeholders and professionals from a variety of fields to converge and share key information 
and address mutual interests in the areas of planning, transit, real estate development and 
financing. I am of the opinion that the most important point Suzuki et al. (2015) addresses is that 
“master plans should not be too prescriptive. Development Parameters depend on diverse site 
conditions and changing market demands.”181 If a transit project or plan evolves and calls for 
higher FARs in the station area then previous land use plans should be able to acknowledge this 
and adapt. This will allow for the transit agency and transit investor to take part in DBLVC 
without additional hindrances to their plans. 
DBLVC Enabling Factor #3: Flexible Zoning 
As Suzuki et al. (2015) mention, there are many parties involved in DBLVC. Negotiations 
happen among planners, transit authorities, developers, landowners and local stakeholders 
seeking mutual interests and benefits.  As a result, “zoning codes and site design parameters 
around stations should be flexible enough to meet changing market demands and diverse local 
needs. Zoning systems can provide flexible and negotiable codes with minimum standards to 
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target station areas, allowing transit companies and developers to adjust site-design 
parameters.”182 However, I agree that “relaxing development regulations around stations alone 
does not ensure transit-supportive land use.”183 In order to achieve this, “municipalities and 
transit agencies need to coordinate the physical integration of rail station facilities with private 
property development and surrounding neighborhoods.”184 With integration, transit accessibility 
can improve and generate more revenues from DBLVC ventures while also increasing farebox 
revenues. At the same time, it should be noted that a lack of flexible zoning or suitable FARs can 
threaten the viability of DBLVC projects. 
DBLVC Enabling Factor #4: Multiple Funding Sources 
 It should be acknowledged by the transit authority and the public that DBLVC is not a 
single funding source that can solve every funding deficit. It cannot be stressed enough that 
diversified funding sources should be studied and available for use by the transit agency to pay 
for transit oriented investments, infrastructure and services in the long run.185  Farebox revenues 
still play a very important role in funding transit investments. As Suzuki et al. (2015) 
acknowledge, DBLVC is a very useful tool, but “land prices by their nature are volatile in 
response to changing economic and political climates, which are beyond the control of local 
governments or transit agencies.”186 A variety of funding sources should be available to counter 
any risks of changing land prices rather than relying solely on DBLVC to fund TOIs. 
DBLVC Enabling Factor #5: Intergovernmental Collaboration 
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 DBLVC requires multiple government entities to work together to deliver transit-related 
projects.  Suzuki et al. (2015) recommends one approach where a single local government body 
that includes the transit agency coordinates planning, design, land acquisition, construction, 
operation and asset management.187 This is not always plausible. For instance, in Toronto there 
are multiple authorities (i.e., Metrolinx, TTC, and etc.) who must work together and whose 
responsibilities occasionally overlap (see Chapter 2.0).  At the same time, I agree with Suzuki et 
al. (2015) that in order for collaboration for DBLVC to be achieved, “it is crucial for transport 
officials to recognize the financial potential and social importance of dealing with land and 
property around their transit stations” rather than focusing solely on service. Additionally, local 
political leaders and councillors can help bring stakeholders together and really get a DBLVC 
project accepted by their communities. Planning and policy authorities could use regulatory 
instruments to allow for the full exploration of development opportunities that new transit 
investment could bring.188 
Land value capture should also be understood as being able to capture value for all 
partners involved.189 From an early stage partners should be clear on learning where the value is, 
how much there is, and who is benefitting.190 Metrolinx has outlined that their landholdings “can 
be used in a collaborative way to act as a catalyst for sustainable development around transit 
stations, levering in private sector participation and funding, and creating new and exciting joint 
development proposals.”191 I believe that this can be the same case with the developable air 
rights that they own above stations. At the same time, “municipal participation in LVC can help 
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unlock and leverage revenue at the local level to help advance transportation priorities.”192  
Every partner should somehow equitably share the wealth of a project. 
DBLVC Enabling Factor #6: Entrepreneurship 
 DBLVC can be used as a simple tool of short-term project finance. However, more transit 
agencies have started to become increasingly entrepreneurial as they implement a Rail + 
Property (R+P) business model for long-term urban finance and development. As a result, 
mainstream property development and asset management around stations has become a large part 
of these entrepreneurial transit agencies. For instance, the Washington Metro Area Transit 
Authority’s (WMATA) “joint development program began in the 1970’s and became known for 
its in-house real estate expertise, pro table deals and innovative deal structures.”193 By adopting 
an entrepreneurial framework and having the proper expertise to engage in DBLVC, transit 
agencies are able to establish a consensus with other stakeholders in “the ownership of and 
responsibilities for land and property management in and around stations.”194 As we historically 
saw with the TTC, developers like Cadillac Fairview were more willing to involve themselves in 
joint development ventures with the transit agency who knew how to negotiate, and understand 
private sector business problems. Through my interview with transit planners from Metrolinx, 
there seems to be a current belief that it is the transit agency’s responsibility to maximize returns 
on property and to treat their land holdings as valuable investments.195 This position might 
indicate a re-emergence of the entrepreneurial framework required for DBLVC implementation 
in Toronto. 
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The development of a new governance and business model was also identified by the 
Metrolinx Land Value Capture Discussion Paper (2013). I agree with the authors of the report 
that there should be two levels of engagement in a LVC project.196 It is first outlined that there 
should be a strategic level where there is general agreement to implement LVC policies. 
Metrolinx has done this by identifying LVC potential in their Investment Strategy. Secondly, 
there should be engagement at the delivery level where value is captured. The biggest factor to 
overcome here is that many transit agencies acknowledge the benefits of LVC, but they fail in 
the delivery step.197 Adding to what the report outlines, it is my opinion that transit agencies 
should enter into LVC practice through the use of easier-to-implement DBLVC instruments. The 
transit agency can act as a catalyst for bringing together public and private sector actors.198 Once 
there are demonstrated successes, it can help build the confidence of the agency and of the 
private development industry who may be more willing to engage in joint development practices 
for instance. 
DBLVC Enabling Factor #7: Clarity 
 I agree with Suzuki et al. (2015) when they mention that rules for DBLVC should be 
clear. This means that DBLVC should be adapted based on local and site specific contexts. For 
instance, “rules for sharing costs, benefits, and risks must support the collaborative actions of 
multiple stakeholders.”199 For example, in Hong Kong, the transit authority offers three options 
for DBLVC benefit sharing to private developers. These options include profits in agreed 
proportions form the sale/lease of properties, assets in kind, and up-front payments from the 
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developers.200  Options are decided on a case-by-case basis based on the development locations 
and market conditions. By offering clarity in DBLVC ventures, I agree that it makes it easier for 
the developer to enter into arrangements with the transit authority especially when working on 
more complex DBLVC ventures above and around stations. This can all be outlined in the RFP 
stage and further negotiations with winning proposal bidders.   
The Metrolinx Land Value Capture Discussion Paper (2013) also spoke about clarity.  It 
should be a priority that key stakeholders agree on a set of objectives surrounding a transit 
oriented investment project using LVC.  Conflicts that can arise based on project objectives have 
the potential to stall, prolong, and/or add to project costs. From an early stage there should be 
“effective collaboration between all the key public sector players… delivering [on] and agreed 
set of objectives and priorities for each LVC project. This collaboration can take many forms – 
voluntary, Special Purpose Vehicle, or statutory.”201 
Additionally, just as the Land Value Capture Discussion Paper outlines, I believe that a 
transit agency like Metrolinx “should establish development principles that will act as guidelines 
for all TOD and economic hub development.”202 Not only will this provide clarity for the transit 
agency in site selection criteria for DBLVC implementation, but it will also mean that the private 
sector could suggest sites to the transit agency that makes sense to engage in DBLVC. 
 Overall, these are just some of the potential enabling factors that will allow for DBLVC 
projects to work for transit agency, the municipality and the private transit investor/developer. 
Through a case study analysis, the next chapter will describe some of the best practices 
associated with using DBLVC instruments to fund transit oriented investments. 
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7.0 DBLVC Case Study - WMATA Joint Development Program – Washington, DC, USA 
As I have outlined, DBLVC implementation can still be a challenge. Transit agencies and 
their planners can tackle these challenges head on if they make sure they follow the seven 
DBLVC enabling factors. One transit agency that has been hailed as meeting these enabling 
factors in their DBLVC practice is the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 
(WMATA). 
 WMATA has one of the most advanced and largest DBLVC programs in North America.  
They have compiled over 40 years of joint development (JD) experience in the Washington, DC 
and surrounding area. As transit financing practitioners Dapo Olajide and Manuel Arcé (2017) 
explain, JD ventures have been undertaken by WMATA since 1975.203  
WMATAs JD success began to occur when the transit agency “and adjacent property 
owners found it useful, on a project-by-project ad hoc basis, to share some land preparation, 
excavation, and construction costs and coordinate building schedules.”204 Since these humble 
beginnings, WMATA now has a working portfolio of more than 65 large-scale JD projects and 
spurring “more than $235 billion [USD] in economic development at or next to Metro 
property.”205 In turn, these JD projects generated about $3.1 billion dollars of property tax 
revenues with half a mile of Metro transit.206 
The transit agency’s JD program was established in 1981. However, WMATA has been 
embarking on its real estate business since the 1960’s.207  At that time, the transit agency began 
delving into the realm of DBLVC by working on smaller scale commercial tie-ins with metro 
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stations. Partnerships were established with the WMATA and “landholders who would realize 
capital gains on property through tie-ins with metro investments.”208 WMATAs real estate 
department arm continues to be pro-active in building their land holdings by screening sites for 
JD potential. Since the establishment of WMATAs real estate and JD arms, a set of JD Policies 
and Guidelines have established the general JD practices for the transit agency.209 Some of the 
purposes of these guidelines include: 
• Disseminating info about WMATA’s JD program to developers, the local 
jurisdictions, the local community, and the general public. 
• Identifying the roles and responsibilities of the actors involved in the JD process and 
establishing procedures for the transit agency’s JD partners. 
• Defining processes for evaluating and estimating JD project benefits.210 
The typical joint development deal is between WMATA and developers “on transit 
adjacent sites that [WMATA] owns and controls.  On a project specific basis, WMATA offers 
preferred developers the development rights to develop retail, residential, and commercial 
buildings on sites adjacent to its subway stations (proposed and/or existing) in exchange for a 
portion of the proceeds from development.”211 Much of this joint development is for the 
purposes of meeting the transit agency’s transit oriented development (TOD) goals which 
increases ridership and is the main motivating factor for using DBLVC instruments like JD to 
fund and expand their transit investments. 
Most of WMATA’s DBLVC projects in their JD program involve the conversion of 
surface parking lots into structures, freeing adjacent land for private residential, commercial, or 
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office development.212 With Metrolinx’s large amount of landholdings near stations (primarily 
parking lots), It is my opinion that some of these instruments could eventually be implemented to 
generate revenue to fund transit oriented investments.  In addition to joint development, transit 
scholars Suzuki et al. (2015) explain that “WMATA has also raised property-related revenues by 
adapting four development-based LVC instruments: air rights sales, site leasing, long-term 
development agreements of WMATA-owned land on and around Metro stations, and connection 
payments from private developers on non-WMATA-owned sites.”213 Some of these DBLVC 
instruments are among the ones I recommend for transit agencies to undertake if they wish to 
enter into the practice of implementing LVC. 
It is also my opinion that much of WMATA’s DBLVC success comes from their close 
coordination with local jurisdictions and developers in the implementation of its JD program. As 
per their JD policies and guidelines, “WMATA requires its selected developers to work with 
local jurisdictions throughout the joint development process” because local jurisdictions have a 
say on planning, zoning and other land use related issues.214 For instance, Arlington County’s 
adoption of a corridor-wide General Land Use Plan (GLUP) allowed for the “flexibility to rezone 
[station] areas for higher densities than originally specified.”215 The early communication and 
coordination of transit projects by WMATA allowed for the County to rezone 11 percent of its 
land to encourage mixed-use and high density development around station areas.216 In fact, it has 
been the case that WMATAs strong success and entrepreneurial appetite for JD has triggered 
County planners to continuously re-evaluate land uses and plans in and around their transit 
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stations.217  Intergovernmental collaboration is certainly a strong suit of WMATAs JD practice. 
Transit agencies like Metrolinx should attempt to build upon their relations with local 
intergovernmental actors.  
After many years of experience working on large scale JD deals, WMATAs guidelines 
and policies for JD clearly outline the role of each actor taking part in JD projects. These actors 
include the WMATA Board of Directors who approve a project, the WMATA JD General 
Manager and staff who ensure development and station access goals are met, the local 
jurisdictions who play an important role in granting transit-supportive zoning around WMATA 
JD sites and also work with consultants to identify sites with JD potential, developers who 
initiate JD proposals and the community who will provide input for a local JD project.218 By 
outlining the entire RFP process, the real estate permit application process, and the goals for its 
JD projects, I believe that this clarity and coordination is another major reason for WMATA’s 
DBLVC success.  
It is also my opinion that in addition to reviewing WMATAs JD Policies and Guidelines, 
transit agencies should look to the early JD experiences of WMATA to understand how they 
could benefit from entering into the field of DBLVC. The first DBLVC agreement for WMATA 
was between the transit agency and a department store in 1969. At the site of their Metro Center 
Station, “WMATA was granted easements as well as ground and underground development 
rights at 50 percent of fair market value, while the [private department store owners] were 
allowed to connect its planned underground mezzanine directly to the Metro Centre Station.”219 
The private department store owners realized the benefits of this partnership including increased 
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pedestrian traffic and agreed to share the costs of constructing the mezzanine and tunnel 
below.220 A second JD project was undertaken by WMATA in 1975. This time “WMATA leased 
the development rights above its Farragut North Station in exchange for an annual $250,000 rent 
payment, and a percentage of net operating income.”221  As transit author Henry Cord (1981) 
described, the “use of air rights, adjacent excess areas and existing zoning with certain approved 
variances resulted in a $14 million [dollar] office-retail complex with a gross floor area 
exceeding 200,000 square feet.”222  A newer larger-scale example of WMATA’s JD success has 
been the White Flint – North Bethesda project. This was a 34 acre mixed-used development 
where WMATA received $66 million USD in exchange for a 55-year lease of the site. The 
project generates 6,500 daily riders.223 These DBLVC projects demonstrate how WMATAs scale 
of JD has involved over the years. These examples also demonstrate how other transit agencies 
wishing to get involved in DBLVC can potentially follow a similar path of success. 
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Figure 10 - WMATA's joint development program contribution to annual operating revenues FY 2004-
12224 
As the WMATA case study establishes, there can still be great financial benefits to the 
use of DBLVC.  However, as I have mentioned previously, while DBLVC instruments like JD 
are useful, they are not an end all solution to fixing the financial struggles of transit agencies.  
Transit scholar Danielle Yu-chen Dai (2011) explains, “as of 2006, the WMATA reported 
average annual revenues of $15 million” from their JD ventures.225 Despite contributing to only a 
trivial amount of a transit agency budget (see Figure 10), JD practices undertaken by WMATA 
have also led to an increase in passenger revenues from $419.6 million USD in 2004 to $752.6 
million USD in 2012 by enhancing station areas and improving access to stations through 
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development of transit oriented investments.226  In addition, I strongly agree with Yu-chen Dai 
(2011) that “joint development [can contribute] to the modernization of poor transit 
infrastructure by improving [transit oriented investments like station] facilities.”227 Metrolinx 
and other transit agencies can look to the example of the WMATA JD program and take note on 
the potential success they can achieve if they dedicate more time and resources to the DBLVC 
cause.   
Transit agencies like Metrolinx have acknowledged the DBLVC successes that transit 
agencies like WMATA have had. Although Metrolinx has had a willingness to engage in some 
form of DBLVC, there has not been much of an attempt to deliver a product. With the Eglinton 
Crosstown project, it was Metrolinx’s first attempt at DBLVC implementation. For my next 
section, I will engage in my own case study of Metrolinx’s DBLVC practice along the Eglinton 
Crosstown corridor and I will outline the challenges they faced. 
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Section 3 
Implementing Development-Based Land Value Capture in Toronto: 
Learning from The Eglinton Crosstown LRT 
In section 3, I provide an overview of the Eglinton Crosstown Light Rail Transit project 
(ECLRT) and Metrolinx’s request for proposal (RFP) to sell the development rights for four 
properties at ECLRT station entrances.  The ECLRT was the first transit project that sparked my 
interest in understanding land value capture. Through my analysis of secondary sources and my 
interviews with current and former transit practitioners from Metrolinx, I outline the challenges 
and barriers that the transit agency faced when attempting to implement DBLVC at the selected 
ECLRT station properties. Among the challenges for the ECLRT DBLVC implementation were 
planning, political, and intra-organizational barriers.    
The main purpose of this section is for transit planners in Toronto to use the ECLRT as a 
learning experience for implementing DBLVC instruments. In conjunction with the previous 
chapters of this paper where I outlined the enabling factors for DBLVC implementation, planners 
should be able to learn from the DBLVC shortcomings of the ECLRT project and understand 
what they can improve upon in the future.  My analysis of the RFP for ECLRT station properties 
merely provides an introduction to the DBLVC potential of the project. When the ECLRT is 
completed, the DBLVC potential for the corridor should be revisited.  
Overall, the ECLRT case study emphasizes the main point of my major paper. DBLVC 
instruments can be an excellent tool for funding transit oriented investments. However, the 
implementation of DBLVC can be difficult in practice. I am of the opinion that Metrolinx should 
not be discouraged by the fact that their RFP to sell development rights at selected ECLRT 
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stations failed.  Rather, the organization and its planners should use this project as a learning 
opportunity for when they choose to implement DBLVC for their future transit projects.  
8.0 Planning for the ECLRT 
 In 2008 the Metrolinx regional transportation plan (RTP) entitled The Big Move (2008) 
called for a 25 year, $50 billion plan for integrated transit in the GTHA.228 The heavily 
politicized Transit City LRT Plan adopted by the City of Toronto and co- developed by the 
former TTC chair Adam Giambroni and Mayor David Miller in March of 2007 was approved by 
Metrolinx as a part of their RTP (see discussion in Section 1). The goal of this plan was to 
introduce transit to areas in the City that needed it the most. LRT technology was chosen for 
Transit City because city planners claimed that it had the capability of meeting increased 
ridership demands at a much lower cost than subways.229 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
228 Metrolinx, "What is the Crosstown?," The Crosstown. http://www.thecrosstown.ca/the-
project/ (accessed June 25, 2017). 
229 Toronto, City of. Transit City Light Rail Plan, 3. 
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Figure 11 - The ECLRT Project Corridor230 
                                                
230 Metrolinx, "What is the Crosstown?" 
Re-Imagining	Transit	Development	in	Toronto Soscia 69 
 
 
Figure 12 - Illustration of ECLRT capacity compared to bus capacity231	
One of the first wave projects of the RTP was the Eglinton Crosstown Light Rail Transit 
(ECLRT) project. In 2010, the ECLRT was estimated as being a $5.3 billion investment toward 
better local transit in the City of Toronto. The ECLRT project “is a light rail transit (LRT) line 
that will run across Eglinton Avenue between Mount Dennis (Weston Road) and Kennedy 
Station. This 19-kilometre corridor will include a 10-kilometre underground portion, between 
Keele Street and Laird Drive” (see Figure 11).232 The project “will have up to 25 stations and 
stops. It will link to 54 bus routes, three subway stations and various GO Transit lines.”233 In 
terms of ridership, Metrolinx is expecting the ECLRT to carry 15,000 passengers per hour, per 
direction (see Figure 12).234 The ECLRT was planned, is being built by, and is owned by 
Metrolinx while the TTC will assume the responsibility of operating the line. Construction is 
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currently underway with service expected to commence in 2021. The overall key objectives of 
the ECLRT project were outlined by Infrastructure Ontario (2016) as: 
• Increased urban transit capacity • Design excellence 
• Managing congestion • A maintained asset for the long-term 
• Seamless customer experience • Delivery on time and on budget 
• Minimized disruption during 
construction 
• Public ownership235 
 
The ECLRT corridor is located along Eglinton Avenue.  This avenue is described as “one 
of the city’s traditional main streets [that] provides a focus for local neighbourhoods, 
employment and shopping, and… links some of the City’s major natural features.”236 The 
introduction of the LRT line will add another focal east-west route for transit in the City. The 
vision of the Eglinton Connects plan attempts to find a nexus between transit and land use. The 
ECLRT has been acknowledged by city planners as being able to support development of a 
predominantly mixed-use and mid-rise character with taller buildings in closer proximity to LRT 
stations (see Figure 13).237 The Eglinton Connects implementation strategies are based on the 
three Visions for the project which include the concepts of travelling, greening and building 
Eglinton (see Figure 14). The objective of this case study, which included my secondary research 
of planning materials, articles and primary interviews with transit practitioners from Metrolinx, 
was to determine if the ECLRT and the City’s vision for Eglinton Avenue could support 
Metrolinx’s attempt to engage in DBLVC. 
                                                
235 Infrastructure Ontario. Value for Money Assessment Eglinton Crosstown Light Rail Transit. 
Toronto, ON. (February 2016): 5.  
236 Toronto, City of. Eglinton Connects Volume 2: Recommendations and Implementation 
Strategies. Toronto, On. (April 2014): 24. 
237 Ibid., 30. 
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Figure 13 - Eglinton Avenue will show a diversity of urban form238 
 
                                                
238Ibid., 115. 
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Figure 14 - The Strategic Vision for Eglinton Avenue239
                                                
239Ibid., 31. 
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In the next chapter, I will outline how Metrolinx is involved in DBLVC. This will include 
a review of studies that Metrolinx conducted or commissioned to determine if they should 
engage in DBLVC financial instruments both in a general capacity and for the ECLRT project. 
In later chapters, I will review the request for proposal that Metrolinx sent out to developers for 
the ECLRT station properties. This will help planners to understand what type of DBLVC that 
Metrolinx was trying to engage in and the scope of their RFP.  
9.0 Considering the use of DBLVC in Funding Transit Oriented Investments 
 In this chapter, I outline Metrolinx’s willingness to get involved in the implementation of 
DBLVC by discussing the commissioned studies and strategic policies of the transit 
organization. I layout the findings of general studies, strategies and policies on potential LVC 
implementation, and those that are more ECLRT specific. I will discuss each, in turn. 
Big Move Implementation Economics: Revenue Tool Profiles (2013) 
 The Revenue Tool Profiles report was prepared by consultant AECOM for Metrolinx. As 
the consultant outlines, “the purpose of [the] document [was] to provide readers with detailed 
information about each of the revenue tools that have been used in other jurisdictions to support 
the development of transit infrastructure.”240 The consultant included an analysis of land value 
capture implementation.  The intention of this report was to provide evaluation of potential 
revenue tool options for the Metrolinx Investment Strategy.241 The evaluation of each tool 
included an analysis on revenue potential, incremental costs, impact on travel behaviour and 
                                                
240 KPMG, and AECOM. Big Move Implementation Economics: Revenue Tool Profiles. Toronto, 
ON, no. 60236189, (March 2013): 1.  
241 Ibid. 
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transportation network performance, scheme design, technical implementation considerations, 
governance considerations, equity and distributional impacts, and overall efficiency impact.242 
 DBLVC was considered in the report as being able to capture additional revenues in two 
ways. The first was inducing land development on land currently owned by Metrolinx along 
transportation corridors as a result of joint ventures. The second option discussed was “through a 
specific delivery agreement with local municipalities in developing privately owned land along 
key transit corridors. By doing this, Metrolinx can share in the revenues realized by the 
developer through the sale of new units.”243  
 In terms of revenue potential, the consultant mentioned that uplift can vary based on the 
type of transit investment, the size, its location and type of development located in the vicinity. It 
was not expected to be a significant revenue generator.244 In particular, they mentioned that 
“revenues are not sustainable over the long-term as there is a limit to the amount of developable 
land in the region, particularly along transit corridors.”245 The typical uplift in property values 
that might benefit a developer in the GTHA as a result of locating a rail station within a half mile 
of a potential development was outlined as either a one-time yield “between $78/SF for a 
downtown office development through to $1.5/SF for a suburban real estate complex” (see 
Figure 15).246 
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Figure 15 - Value Capture Illustrations for the GTHA for developers247 
 One barrier that the report outlined was the incremental costs of administrative terms 
associated with implementing LVC. Additionally, there would be increased legal costs 
“associated with developing the contracts that Metrolinx or the regional transit authorities will be 
entering into with the private developers and investors.”248 In terms of the impact on 
transportation network performance, the consultant report outlined that “If the proportion of land 
value appreciation attributed to transit initiatives is too high, it could lead to reduced real estate 
development in the region as developers may not view these types of developments as being 
profitable.”249 However, “If LVC can be implemented successfully, it could lead to more 
intensive land uses by making it less profitable for owners to withhold land for speculative 
purposes.”250 
In terms of technical consideration, the report was quick to mention that “zoning changes 
may be required to ensure that the property in question can realize its full incremental value.”251 
This could act as a large barrier for the transit agency in working with developers if they cannot 
achieve a sufficient financial return on their JD investment. When implementing this tool, it 
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would most likely require Metrolinx to establish upfront procedures and mechanisms for the 
transit agency to engage with developers and owners to engage in revenue collection. 
Overall, Metrolinx’s main takeaways from this report were: 
• “Land value capture is a modest revenue tool which should be used on a project-
by-project basis to generate funding. 
• If structured properly, LVC effectively funds infrastructure initiatives by drawing 
on the land value uplift created by the project. 
• The initial implementation [of LVC] may be costly in terms of time and 
administrative effort, because each LVC tool needs to be adapted to the 
circumstances of the particular property in question – otherwise, it is not possible 
to limit the LVC to the extraction of the designated windfall gain.”252 
 
Metrolinx Investment Strategy (2013) 
 Metrolinx took what they learned from the Big Move Implementation Economics: 
Revenue Tool Profiles report (2013) and included it in forming their Investment Strategy.  The 
organization identified that they could use land value capture to tie land use and transportation 
closely together at the local level.253 In this strategy, the organization acknowledged that their 
next wave of transit projects would have the ability to increase the value of land near their 
proposed corridors and stations. Metrolinx would attempt to undertake DBLVC though property 
development or joint ventures based on a sharing of costs and/or revenues. The organization 
outlined that: 
“LVC is a tool worth pursuing to unlock private sector financial contributions, 
enhance collaboration and information sharing between the development community 
and transportation providers to the benefits of all, and reduce the cost of developing 
public infrastructure and achieve smart growth objectives, recognizing the results 
will vary on a site-by-site basis. Land value capture strategies also provide incentives 
for the landowners in the vicinity to move ahead with their development plans, 
thereby increasing the speed at which the full value of the rapid transit investment is 
realized in commercial and residential development. It is recommended that 
Metrolinx work with municipalities and the land development industry to develop a 
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land value capture strategy for the Next Wave of rapid transit projects, which also 
considers existing and under-construction rapid transit assets, to ensure an 
appropriate private-sector contribution towards the cost of stations and other 
infrastructure. Metrolinx will work to achieve greater land value capture by 
strategically planning and advancing rapid transit projects.”254 
 
The Metrolinx Investment Strategy (2013) demonstrates that DBLVC implementation is on 
Metrolinx’s radar.  
2017-2022 Metrolinx Five Year Strategy (2017) 
 The Five Year Strategy (FYS) provides Metrolinx with a “roadmap for 2017 to 2022, 
bridging the RTP and Metrolinx annual business plans. It [shapes their decision] making, 
influencing [their] priority projects, as well as how [they] go about delivering them.”255 The FYS 
outlines the importance of DBLVC instruments such as joint development and seeking private 
partners for transit-oriented development on Metrolinx properties.256 In terms of joint 
development deals, I believe that Metrolinx does well by announcing their willingness to 
establish partnerships with the private sector in leasing/selling properties at station locations for 
cafés and retail stores at station locations.257 These are the necessary small steps when first 
entering into DBLVC. The groundwork and results must follow this organizational willingness 
to engage in joint development. 
Eglinton Crosstown Rapid Transit Benefits Case (2012) 
 An analysis of LVC potential was undertaken as a part of the evaluation of four options 
for ECLRT station alignment in 2012.  This analysis was based on the findings of the studies 
above and Metrolinx’s willingness to engage in LVC as described in their investment strategy.  
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The fact that an analysis of land value uplift estimates was included in the benefits case 
demonstrated a real willingness for the transit agency to engage in joint development and sale of 
development rights at station properties. (see Figure16). 
 
Figure 16 - Land Value Capture estimates for each ECLRT layout option demonstrate some form of 
uplift258 
Based on these studies and strategies, it is my opinion that Metrolinx does acknowledge 
the potential use of DBLVC instruments and their benefits at a strategic level. However, the 
transit agency fails in the delivery step. The ECLRT RFP that was issued by Metrolinx to sell 
development rights at station properties was an attempt at changing this. The next chapter will 
describe what the RFP entailed. Later chapters will outline the challenges and barriers that the 
transit agency faced in engaging in DBLVC for the ECLRT. 
10.0 Issuing the RFP – Selling Development Rights at Station Properties 
 I have previously outlined that Metrolinx has adopted a willingness to engage in the 
practice of DBLVC. The ECLRT requests for proposals (RFP) were hailed by Metrolinx as the 
first examples of trying to engage in LVC in the GTHA.259 This project would allow the transit 
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agency to engage in a development opportunity to maximize non-fare revenue potential at transit 
properties and subsequently fund transit oriented investments.260   
 Metrolinx issued their requests for proposals to build on and above four station properties 
on Friday, February 27th, 2015. These RFPs were issued to attract developers who wished to 
develop mix-used transit-integrated projects at and around any of the four selected station 
properties. The four strategic properties were already either acquired or would be acquired by 
“Metrolinx in order to locate above and below-ground transit infrastructure required to facilitate 
the design and construction of the new [ECLRT] system” (see Figures 17, 18 and 19).261 These 
properties were located along Eglinton Avenue in the City of Toronto at Weston Road (1 Hollis 
Street), two properties at Keele Street (2660, 2615 Eglinton Avenue) for primary and secondary 
station entrances, and another property at the northeast corner of Bathurst Street (842 Eglinton 
Avenue West). The RFP described the neighbourhoods where the station properties were located 
as such: 
“The Mt. Dennis neighbourhood in the old town of Weston, and Keele–Eglinton, part 
of the “Eglinton Hill BIA”, are quite similar. Both are neighbourhoods characterized 
by diverse ethnicity. Although some high-rise residential buildings are present, the 
majority of housing comprises affordable single-family homes on narrow lots many 
of 1920’s wood construction. Retail storefronts provide a variety of restaurants and 
personal grooming services although the largest and most notable retailers are 
Caplan’s Appliances and Dollarama. There are several storefront churches as well as 
traditional churches giving evidence to the vast number of religions and cultures in 
the area.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
https://www.thestar.com/news/city_hall/2015/02/25/metrolinx-to-sell-development-rights-at-
eglinton-crosstown-lrt-stops.html (accessed July 1, 2017). 
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Bathurst and Eglinton is an upscale neighbourhood serviced by retail establishments 
located along Eglinton Avenue primarily west of Bathurst Street. These include 
popular restaurants, convenience stores, banks and pharmacies. East of Bathurst, 
Eglinton transitions to a residential strip with mid-rise residential brick buildings 
built in the 50’s and 60’s. Behind the modest facades of these buildings is the 
neighbourhood of Forest Hill, one of the most prestigious enclaves in Toronto.”262 
 
The four properties in question were chosen because others were not in compliance with zoning 
or were not financially viable to undertake increased development.263  
The RFP also outlined the following details for potential development partners: 
“A developer who participates in the RFP is referred to in the RFP as a “Proponent”. 
A Proponent who is selected pursuant to this RFP to enter into negotiations with 
Metrolinx with respect to one or more Station Sites may, if negotiations are 
successful, enter into a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) with Metrolinx, 
pursuant to which the “Successful Proponent” will be provided a 6-month due 
diligence period (subject to extension by Metrolinx in accordance with the MOU) to 
assess the development opportunity and prepare a concept design for the applicable 
Station Site in accordance with the MOU. A Proponent will be chosen for each of the 
four sites individually, although a single Proponent can be selected for more than one 
site. The Successful Proponent may wish to use the due diligence period to enhance 
the development by assembling the adjoining properties. Subject to and in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of the MOU, the Successful Proponent 
shall enter into a purchase agreement with Metrolinx to acquire title to that portion of 
the Station Site on which the proposed development will be constructed.”264 
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Figure 17 - Western portion of the ECLRT where the RFP station properties were located265 
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Figure 18 - Locating the RFP station properties on a map266 
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Figure 19 - Close up aerial view of the station properties proposed for development267
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In terms scheduling for the DBLVC project, the RFP outlined the following timeline: 
1. The RFP is expected to be issued on or about February 25, 2015;  
2. A Proponents Meeting is estimated to take place in early March 2015; 
3. The submission deadline for Proponents to submit their Proposals in 
accordance with the RFP is estimated to be late April 2015; 
4. A successful Proponent is expected to be identified for each Station Site in 
May 2015; 
5. Execution by each Successful Proponent of a MOU for each applicable 
Station Site is estimated to take place in mid-June 2015 
6. The due diligence period and development of a concept design in 
accordance with the MOU for each Station Site is estimated to take place 
from June 2014 to January 2016; and 
7. The execution of the purchase agreement in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of the MOU is estimated to take place in early 2016.268 
Real estate reporter Tess Kalinowski (2015) reported that Metrolinx expected “to earn up 
to $76 million selling rights to build above four LRT stations it will construct on the new 
Eglinton Crosstown line.”269 In particular, the transit agency expected to “earn between $14 
million and $19 million per station from developers who build ‘mixed residential and retail 
spaces,’ which in turn increase ridership.”270 This project was to be the first step into a vision of 
selling development rights for future locations on the 25-station ECLRT line. 
Another positive sign of the RFP was that many municipal planners including City of 
Toronto Chief Planner Jennifer Keesmaat supported the project by indicating that single-storey 
stations were not appropriate for the context of Eglinton.  In particular, she was quoted as saying 
that “in an urban context, station entrances should be integrated into buildings… this is a critical 
approach to linking and integrating land-use planning with transit infrastructure investments.”271 
Even with all of this support, the RFP to engage in DBLVC did not turn out as planned. The last 
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chapter of this case study will outline the barriers and challenges to DBLVC implementation for 
the ECLRT project sites identified in the RFP and for DBLVC projects in general. 
11.0 Barriers and Challenges to ECLRT DBLVC Implementation  
Despite all of the hype and anticipation surrounding the RFP for these potential DBLVC 
station projects, nothing came to fruition. After the first stage of the procurement process, 
Metrolinx only received one submission to develop a mix-used transit-integrated project at the 
Mt Dennis/Weston Road (1 Hollis Street) property. After the six-month due diligence period, the 
proposal with the developer fell through for a number of reasons.272 This section of ECLRT case 
study will identify the various challenges and barriers that Metrolinx faced by attempting to 
engage in DBLVC both in general and at the four RFP station properties. The purpose of this 
analysis is so planners at Metrolinx can have a record of the challenges and barriers they have 
faced in DBLVC implementation. This analysis will provide the organization with a starting 
point so that they can improve on DBLVC in the future. 
11.1 Planning Challenges 
The first issue with the RFP that Metrolinx planners outlined in our interviews was the 
planning challenges they faced. I should note that Metrolinx is not in the primary business of real 
estate development. In fact, provincial legislation prohibits them from acquiring land for non-
transit development purposes and participating in a project as a primary developer. By partnering 
with the private sector in either joint development deals or by selling the development rights for 
station properties, they would be able to unlock their land value potential this way.273  
                                                
272 "Metrolinx Interview 1." Interview by author. Toronto, June 28, 2017. 
273 "Metrolinx Interview 2." Interview by author. Toronto, June 28, 2017. 
Re-Imagining	Transit	Development	in	Toronto Soscia 86 
The properties identified in the RFP gave Metrolinx the opportunity to sell development 
rights to private builders who would increase densities and build mixed-use developments that 
were integrated with stations. However, municipal plans and zoning codes for the four RFP 
station sites deterred developers from entering into the DBLVC deals and prevented the transit 
agency from unlocking their full land value potential. As one of the Metrolinx planners 
explained to me,  
“the existing issue [was] that there [was not] much financial opportunity on a lot of 
the sites since zoning was low.”274  
Zoning was a primary concern for developers who would not get enough of a financial return on 
their investment. Subsequently, the lack of financial return was also a major concern for the 
transit agency who would potentially receive little to no financial benefits from a revenue-
sharing arrangement with a potential development partner. 
The challenge began with the general planning framework that the ECLRT project fit 
within. This included the city wide (Official Plan, Avenues and Mid-Rise Guidelines) and the 
area specific (Eglinton Connects) context (see Figure 20). In terms of this context, Eglinton 
Connects (2014) is where the main barrier rested. Eglinton Connects is the comprehensive 
corridor wide planning study undertaken by the City of Toronto for Eglinton Avenue and the 
ECLRT that was approved by City Council in May, 2014.275 A consolidated version of the 
Eglinton Connects study states that: 
“[Eglinton Connects] proposes a holistic Vision for the Eglinton Avenue corridor, a 
detailed public realm, streetscape, built form and open space plan, and an 
accompanying implementation plan. It represents the next generation of ‘Avenue 
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Study’ for the City; one that considers all elements of urban development together to 
create a sustainable, diverse and accessible future.”276  
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Figure 20 - The ECLRT Planning Framework 277 
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The study area for the ECLRT and Eglinton Avenue included 34 kilometers of building 
frontage on Eglinton Avenue and crossing through 12 wards. In terms of implementing the plan, 
“updates to the Official Plan and Zoning By-Law… were adopted by City Council in the summer 
of 2014” to ensure the goals and vision of this plan for Eglinton Avenue were met.278 In 
conjunction with the City’s Avenues and Mid-Rise Buildings Guidelines, it was recommended 
by planners to the public that “mid-rise buildings (4-11 storeys) [were only considered] 
appropriate along the portions of Eglinton that [were] identified as an Avenue in the Official 
Plan.”279  
 
Figure 21 - Zoning for mid-rise buildings was encouraged along Eglinton Avenue280 
   
 When analyzing the permitted height and density at the four RFP station properties, the 
Metrolinx planners that I interviewed stressed that the current zoning and vision for Eglinton 
Avenue would not allow for high-rise development in most cases. The zoning provisions would 
not allow developers or the transit agency to receive a worthwhile return on their financial 
investments at some station sites and would therefore spoil the DBLVC potential.  The Metrolinx 
planners also mentioned that improved Eglinton Connects Zoning (By-law 1030-2014) did not 
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increase the height and density enough to meet the financial goals of a development proforma for 
high-rise, transit supportive, and station adjacent development (see Figure 22). In particular, “the 
Weston Road site can take high-rises, while eight-storey buildings are the tallest permitted by the 
city on the other three”.281  One of the Metrolinx planners that I interviewed provided an 
example of the best case scenario for the transit agency if one of the RFPs advanced through the 
first stage of procurement: 
“[The transit agency] could look at the profit and it would [for example] be $8 
million and the costs of the station would be $50, $60, $70 million dollars and the cut 
wasn’t going all to [the transit agency]. In the scale of things, of these multi-million 
dollar projects, [DBLVC] wasn't going to generate a lot of revenue here.”282 
 
It was also mentioned by the Metrolinx planners whom I interviewed that, “midrise [was] 
the standard height that was set along most of Eglinton Avenue because through the public 
consultation process, the majority of the public expressed [their satisfaction for this].”283 On the 
other hand, “developers always want to maximize their profit. Wherever density is possible they 
have a better chance of making money. As far as the [City] planners are concerned, they just 
want to listen to the public. They do not want to get a lot of resistance from the public”. This 
demonstrated that the Eglinton Connects plan and City zoning set a vision and guideline for 
midrise development along the Avenue that could not financially support the potential for 
DBLVC implementation at the four RFP station sites. 
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Figure 22 – An Overview  of the four station sites including zoning, site area and proposed transit infrastructure284 
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The RFP to engage in DBLVC practices at the four station properties also failed because 
City planners did not put in the groundwork to identify what might be appropriate as a “taller 
building” for some of the RFP station sites with DBLVC potential such as 1 Hollis Street or 842 
Eglinton Avenue West.285  As one of the planners explained: 
“The city conducted a planning exercise [for densities along Eglinton Avenue] but in 
their approach they took the easy route rather than the hard one. So for three-storey 
buildings they said maybe you can now go to five, but what tended to happen if there 
was a corner site or potential station site, well that should be investigated through 
further studies. So [City planners] didn’t advance planning on any sites that would 
actually be helpful for [Metrolinx and their RFPs] in terms of getting additional 
permissions on them. This includes those big sites that had development 
opportunities.” 
 
Many locations along Eglinton Avenue received as-of-right permissions which sped up the 
development application process for mid-rise development.286 For developers wishing to submit 
a proposal for denser development at some of the RFP station locations, they would be required 
to engage in additional due diligence. This due diligence would determine if the height and 
density permitted by City planners on these projected “taller” sites would allow for a reasonable 
financial return that could justify the execution of a purchase agreement with the transit agency. 
This added an amount of risk to the project that some developers would have wanted to avoid.  
One Metrolinx planner that I interviewed also wondered whether creating a midrise 
guideline for the entire Avenue was detrimental to the RFPs success and the implementation of 
potential DBLVC for the ECLRT. One of the planners that I interviewed posed an interesting 
question for the transit agency and municipality to consider in the future: 
“What I would wonder is that by [conducting] a recent planning exercise [like 
Eglinton Connects] do you make it harder for the developer to make their case for 
higher densities because it has recently been reviewed and found to be [midrise]? 
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Would it be better If the study didn’t happen and instead [the developer] just puts 
forward an application [with] the best case [they] have?” 
 
The alternative to creating an comprehensive vision for the Avenue would be the review of sites 
on a case-by-case basis. This could potentially help developers and transit agencies in receiving 
the additional height and density required for DBLVC implementation. As City of Toronto Chief 
Planner Jennifer Keesmaat however explains, “It should be noted that densification does not 
mean ‘anything goes’ or any intensification is good… the city’s “built form” framework 
“provides direction to ensure this intensification is in keeping with the character of existing 
neighbourhoods and respects adjacent sites.”287 Ultimately, unlike midrise zoning which was 
regarded as a major financial barrier for the transit agency and private developers, this was an 
interesting discussion point rather than a definitive barrier for the RFP and DBLVC 
implementation. This approach might be considered for future projects. The next section 
addresses the political challenges that the transit agency faced after issuing their RFP.  
11.2 Political Challenges 
The second barrier that Metrolinx planners faced with their ECLRT RFP was a political 
challenge. Specifically, this was the challenge of preparing station development RFPs for a 
transit line that was initially planned for without any discussion of DBLVC implementation or 
transit oriented development (TOD) objectives. Early on, the ECLRT was envisioned purely as a 
‘transit project’ with service and capital investment goals.  This was evidenced by Mayor 
Miller’s political platform that called for light rail transit projects to connect all corners of the 
city. From a land acquisitions standpoint, the properties surrounding the ECLRT corridor were 
solely planned for standalone stations without any opportunity for increased TOD.288 By the time 
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that the City of Toronto approached Metrolinx to implement TOD components for the ECLRT 
project, the footprints required for larger scale mixed-use developments that were integrated with 
station entrances were not readily available.289 As one planner explained the challenge to me in 
detail: 
“When the ECLRT project was first politically initiated, it was simply for the transit 
purpose. Nobody was talking about TOD or LVC. This is why there was no appetite 
for TOD and joint development then. This is why we just acquired land for stand-
alone stations then. There would not be enough of a footprint for further 
development, so this handcuffed our potential on these sites. For the station, say you 
needed three properties to build the station, to build any kind of development 
associated with the station you probably needed another 3 or 4, you probably [could 
not] use expropriation to buy the other properties because you don’t have a transit 
reason to do that, and that is the reason why we didn't really acquire other 
properties.” 290 
 
The Metrolinx planners that I interviewed believed that TOD and DBLVC considerations 
should have been taken into account in the earliest planning stages of the ECLRT project and the 
Eglinton Connects corridor study. As one Metrolinx planner explained to me: 
“As far as TOD and LVC is concerned, we need to get the TOD component into the 
planning stage as early as possible.”291 
 
By introducing the TOD component into the early planning stages it would have allowed for 
transit and city planners to anticipate a vision for higher-order station infrastructure. The 
planners I interviewed mentioned that this would have helped avoid rushing the RFP to sell 
development rights at stations to the market and avoid other problems.292 If TOD considerations 
were included in the vision for Eglinton Avenue, Metrolinx may have also anticipated the need 
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for larger station sites in the early stages of the ECLRT project. These could have helped in the 
success of DBLVC implementation along the corridor.  
Because TOD and LVC considerations were introduced as secondary components of the 
Transit City ECLRT project, there was also an organizational belief within Metrolinx that the 
RFPs for station property developments would slow down the entire transit project. The transit 
project RFP was already in the works with billions of dollars granted by different levels of 
government. The ECLRT and all of its funding could not face the risk of the additional 
developments at station sites that could potentially prolong the development of the transit line. 
As one Metrolinx planner expressed: 
“There is a funding announcement, a deadline, you need to deliver the project in that 
timeframe and that is pretty darn important. Things perceived as slowing it down are 
a risk for the project.”293 
 
Prolonging the project would have generated even more public backlash that Metrolinx was 
already facing with the ECLRT.294 With the transit project already facing a number of delays, 
and with one of its main objectives to be completed on time and on budget, the RFP was 
considered as a risky venture for the transit agency to engage in.  
The politicized nature of the Transit City plan and the ECLRT project also prevented 
Metrolinx from capturing the largest potential land value uplift. The fact that David Miller and 
Adam Giambroni decided to implement LRT technology for the ECLRT prevented this greater 
uplift from happening. Typically, as the Metrolinx planners explained to me, it is “the rule of 
thumb that higher order rapid transit generates greater development benefits. The top of this 
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hierarchy would be subway development, the bottom is bus, and LRT is somewhere in the 
middle. LRT is not true rapid transit.”295  Some of the planners that I interviewed believed that 
higher order transit may have convinced city planners to permit higher density developments 
along Eglinton Avenue such as on the four RFP station properties.296 One of the Metrolinx 
planners that conducted the benefits case for what became the ECLRT project outlined the entire 
political issue for me : 
“The problem with Eglinton [Avenue] from the get go was the Metrolinx board. It 
was dominated at the time by the mayor of Toronto David Miller and the [former] 
TTC Chair Adam Giambroni. They refused to listen to the best technical alternative. 
From my standpoint, as the so called technical expert, what should have been built 
was a truly rapid transit line and because of the spatial constraints on Eglinton 
[Avenue], you would have run the line overhead along the eastern extremity of 
Eglinton [Avenue] and through the centre you would have went through a tunnel. 
But the objective from our standpoint was to create the fastest possible trip time 
between Scarborough City Centre over to the Pearson Airport area so that transit 
would be competitive with Highway 401. I'm afraid that streetcars and LRT don't 
quite cut it, especially when they are running at grade… To make a long story short, 
I think we have a different outcome on Eglinton [Avenue] if the [Metrolinx] board 
did not reject our advice… in 2008 to go with genuine rapid transit. It would have 
generated higher ridership and revenue numbers and Eglinton [Avenue] would have 
become a regional rapid transit corridor as opposed to what we are building today 
which is a very high cost but local transit system… The technology choice, the 
project scope were poor decisions… As a result, Eglinton will never reach its full 
potential as the next Bloor Line running east-west through the heart of Toronto. In 
terms of DBLVC potential, we would have had fewer stations and the stations would 
have been aligned even more closely with development potential. But the ridership 
numbers would have been greater, because a more rapid Eglinton line would have 
been more successful in achieving modal shift, and not just modal shift from the 
Eglinton corridor, but modal shift from other east-west corridors including HWY 
401. This would have driven denser development and the increased potential for land 
value uplift. The city politicians in particular and the Metrolinx board were so 
[invested] in Transit City and achieving the LRT dream that Mayor Miller rode into 
office on.”297 
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Overall, the political intervention involved in planning a transit line for Eglinton 
Avenue compromised the potential for denser mix-use developments on station sites 
including those identified in the RFP. As I established, this was because TOD objectives 
were considered in the later stages of the planning process. Additionally, the former 
Mayor, ex-TTC Chair and Metrolinx Board decided on the implementation of LRT 
technology along Eglinton Avenue. The decision prevented Metrolinx from capturing the 
largest potential land value uplift for station properties along the corridor. This was 
because an LRT line might not have generated the additional ridership to support higher 
densities in the area. Both of these factors established a challenge for implementing 
DBLVC along Eglinton Avenue and created a barrier for development on the RFP sites.  
11.3 Intra-Organizational Challenges 
The third barrier that Metrolinx planners faced in DBLVC implementation was general 
intra-organizational challenges. These challenges extended among divisions within the transit 
agency and were apparent in the case of the station development RFP.  As I noted in Chapter 8, 
Metrolinx has some willingness to engage in DBLVC at a strategic level. However, as the 
Metrolinx planners that I interviewed explained, there is a clear lack of experience within the 
transit agency when engaging in DBLVC projects.  As one former Metrolinx employee who 
worked on the ECLRT described this lack of DBLVC expertise: 
“I don't think at the transit agency level there are skilled people who know how to 
cut real estate deals, and even if we did they do not necessarily have the mandate, 
because at some levels there is still some kind of aversion to deal making. At [the 
transit agency] level between the public and the private sector there is a belief that 
there will come connotations of collusion. So we need to grow up a bit in that 
regard… I think it should be the organic evolution of planner to have more of an 
economic dimension to it and this continuous read of the market.”298 
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Adding to this statement that planners must learn about urban economics and real estate 
development, another Metrolinx planner explained that: 
“There is not enough astute deal making in the transit agency.  The transit agency in 
a dense urban environment, and in an environment that is led by a strong economy 
and market forces should be adept at real estate development. In some of these more 
advanced transit systems, the real estate imperative comes first. I’m not saying that it 
should be the case here, but it should be more advanced than it already is.”299 
 
Additionally, there was the belief among some planners that once Metrolinx disbanded 
their economic practice, the organization would be dominated by planners who do not 
understand the real estate market. For example, one Metrolinx planner that I interviewed 
mentioned that: 
“[Some] planners [In either Design or Station Planning] spend an inordinate amount 
of time and money developing the so called Mobility Hub Strategy and after all of 
these years, maybe 10 years of getting it underway, there is very little to nothing to 
show for it on the ground. Unless you bring in the real estate market dynamics it is 
completely an academic study.” 
 
 It was clear that Metrolinx as a transit organization was still in a stage of infancy. 
They did not have the track record of engaging in DBLVC projects. Metrolinx 
acknowledged that the RFP was the first time they were looking to engage in any sort of 
DBLVC implementation in the GTHA. As a result, it was hard for the entire transit agency 
to accept DVBLC as a good idea. This lack of recognition for DBLVC implementation 
among the entire organization may have deterred developers from submitting proposals for 
the RFP. For instance, simple mistakes such as “not owning the land in question before 
issuing an RFP” could have alerted developers that they might be wasting their time with 
their proposals if they could not even acquire the site in the end. 300 
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As one Metrolinx employee reiterated in our interview, it was clear that they lacked 
DBLVC experience: 
“As far as we are concerned we are new and lack DBLVC experience… It is very 
hard to sell this idea even within Metrolinx because this is primarily a transit 
organization. The primary business is transit so the people’s mentality is always 
about operations and delivery of capital projects while everything else is a barrier to 
their projects. Because Metrolinx is focused on operations they don’t have the savvy 
of the track record to be proactive in engaging developers… they even lack the 
message that they are open for business.”301 
 
The transit agency’s lack of DBLVC experience and entrepreneurial drive to engage in 
development was outlined in another of my interviews. One current Metrolinx planner stated 
that: 
“I think based on a lot of history and smart decisions, if there were four corners and 
there was a large parcel with development potential, in a lot of cases [Metrolinx] 
would stay away from that parcel and say ‘why would we take a piece of the large 
parcel and sort of spoil the development opportunities. Let take what we need… for 
the station… rather than taking a piece of a large property or taking a large property 
that if people are being honest’ with ourselves. Whether it’s the TTC or us, we are 
not really great about talking about development so we would not doing anyone a 
favour by acquiring a large parcel was our thinking at the time.”302 
 
While on one the hand there was a willingness and anticipation for DBLVC 
implementation within the agency from the Business Strategies and Corporate Real Estate 
divisions, other divisions focusing primarily on service and operations did not buy into the 
idea of engaging in DBLVC because of the lack of expertise. Although Metrolinx 
executives understood that TOD objectives and DBLVC implementation was important for 
their projects, they were ultimately averse to any change. Other groups within the 
organization were focused on implementing other large projects such as regional express 
rail (RER).  One planner that I interviewed believed that a focus on large organizational 
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service projects such as RER was taking away from Metrolinx’s ability to focus on any 
DBLVC projects. As a result, the time and effort that should have went into projects such 
as the development RFP was not given. 
12.0 Lessons Learned from the ECLRT DBLVC Project 
The ECLRT case study emphasizes the main point of my major paper. DBLVC 
instruments can be an excellent tool for funding transit oriented investments. However, the 
implementation of DBLVC can be difficult in practice. The transit agency and its planners 
should use this project as a learning opportunity for when they choose to implement DBLVC for 
their future transit projects. Based on the planning, political, and intra-organizational challenges 
outlined in this case study, Metrolinx should be able to learn from the shortcomings of the RFP. 
In terms of zoning, transit planners could potentially engage in deeper discussions with 
city planners and officials to encourage discussions around higher densities along Avenues in 
Toronto. This can be established through the creation of a forum that is open to discussion 
between the transit agency, the municipal planners and the developers.  At the same time, by 
putting in the groundwork to establish as-of-right zoning for potential high-density station areas, 
this could provide financial certainty for developers and alleviate the risks that might deter them 
from entering into DBLVC arrangements with transit agencies.  
 In regards to the political challenges that the ECLRT project RFP faced, the transit 
agency should be able to meet their strategic objectives such as DBLVC implementation without 
having to abandon them in favour of meeting a political timeline of a project. Transit agencies 
like Metrolinx could work closely with their municipality and incorporate TOD and LVC 
objectives within the project framework at an early date. The implementation of DBLVC cannot 
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be a secondary objective introduced at the later stages of a transit project or else it risks the 
potential for DBLVC implementation at station properties. 
 Finally, when it comes to intra-organizational challenges that a transit agency could face, 
the entire organization must adopt a value planning philosophy that allows for DBLVC 
implementation to happen. Even if there is a learning curve to each project, transit agency 
planners will gain the experience of working on DBLVC projects and will learn from their 
mistakes. Future planners could train themselves in simple financial exercises such as being able 
to produce a proforma or taking real estate development and urban economics courses in 
university to make up for their lack of expertise in real estate deal making and DBLVC 
implementation.  
Overall, my analysis of the RFP for ECLRT station property development merely 
provides an introduction to the DBLVC potential of the ECLRT project. When the ECLRT is 
completed, the DBLVC potential for the corridor should be revisited.   
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Section 4 
Summary and Conclusions 
 Overall, it is my opinion that I have successfully met the objectives that were set out 
earlier in my major paper.  From the outset I was able to set a lineal context for land value 
capture implementation in Toronto.  The City of Toronto previously had a storied history of 
value planning and land value capture implementation. I outlined how the development of the 
Yonge Subway line demonstrated the positive financial uplift effect that transit projects can have 
on land values in the City. This case of the Yonge Subway line also proved that land value 
capture implementation could be successfully implemented by transit agencies in Toronto. 
Despite the success of the Yonge Subway project, the practice of land value capture ultimately 
faded away with political interference and financial pressures mounting on the transit agency. 
Many of these pressures are still causing challenges for transit agencies who wish to engage in 
land value capture in Toronto and elsewhere in North America. 
Moving on, I was able to describe to planners how land value capture works and why it is 
a growing practice for transit agencies looking to fund their transit projects. The economic 
impacts of transit-induced land capitalization have proved to be a strong case for DBLVC 
implementation. 
Furthermore, I was able to explain that transit agencies who have an interest in land value 
capture should implement DBLVC instruments over their tax-based counterparts. Some of these 
factors include higher revenue potentials, lower financial risks, lower political risks and lower 
implementation costs. There are also benefits when it comes to joint development partnerships. 
All of these factors prove that Development-Based Land Value Capture instruments have a 
significant advantage over Tax- or Fee- Based Land Value Capture instruments when it comes 
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“ease” of implementation. The case of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s 
Joint Development practice demonstrated these advantages. Implementation of DBLVC 
instruments is still no easy task and I outline some of the common challenges of DBLVC 
implementation. Transit agencies and their DBLVC partners must ensure that they meet various 
enabling factors such as ensuring intergovernmental relationships that foster DBLVC practices, 
adopting an entrepreneurial approach towards transit development and finance, and ensuring 
clarity in DBLVC by establishing guidelines within the organization and for DBLVC partners. 
These enabling factors will allow for smooth implementation of these DBLVC revenue 
generating instruments. 
 Lastly by analyzing the Eglinton Crosstown request for proposal to sell development 
rights at station properties, I was able to highlight the challenges that Metrolinx planners faced in 
DBLVC implementation in Toronto. I initially believed that this project signalled a strong re-
emergence of land value capture in Toronto. Although my case study proved that transit agencies 
in Toronto such as Metrolinx have some interest in using DBLVC as a strategy to fund their 
transit oriented investments, not everyone in the transit agency is on board with this idea. A lack 
of real estate and DBLVC experience within the organization has created a barrier for successful 
land value capture implementation. Additionally, municipal planners have not worked closely 
enough with the transit agency to ensure that zoning and floor area ratios at station sites would 
be sufficient enough to generate the return on investments that would attract developers towards 
entering into DBLVC ventures with the transit agency. Political barriers specific to the Eglinton 
Crosstown LRT also greatly reduced the DBLVC success of this project. In particular, DBLVC 
and transit-oriented development goals have not been incorporated into transit and land-use plans 
from the outset. Additionally, plans believed that more discussions surrounding transit 
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technology should also occur with DBLVC objectives in mind. These discussions should occur 
because different transit technologies have been proven to have various impacts on ridership and 
transit-induced land capitalization that affect DBLVC objectives. 
In summary, it is my hope that this research will encourage all planners in the City of 
Toronto to once again engage in serious conversations around Development-Based Land Value 
Capture. Hopefully city planners, the transit agency and the development industry can 
understand why DBLVC is so useful for funding transit oriented investments. Furthermore, I 
expect that transit planners in Toronto can work around the barriers of development-based land 
value capture implementation once they learn from the shortcomings of the Eglinton Crosstown 
LRT request for proposal. I believe that using DBLVC implementation to fund transit oriented 
investments is certainly a possibility in Toronto. It might take a few attempts for a transit agency 
without much value planning experience like Metrolinx to have a successful RFP bid for a 
DBLVC project. However, it is my opinion that this will happen in the next few years if they are 
able to work around the planning, political and intra-organization challenges they alongside 
many North American transit agencies currently face. 
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